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About This Document
This HOWTO is not a HOWTO.
In 2000-2001 this document started ts life as an addendum to a DNSSEC
course I organized at the RIPE NCC but in cause of time it has grown beyond
the size of your typical HOWTO and became a (hopefully) comprehensive tutorial
on the subject of DNSSEC and DNSSEC deployment.
This HOWTO is intended for those people who want to deploy DNSSEC
and are seeking a document that lives between a typical high level description
of the topic (see the excellent Surfnet White Paper on DNSSEC for that (http:
//www.surfnet.nl/Documents/DNSSSEC-web.pdf ), the typical out of the box
recipe, and an in depth description of the technology.
I this tutorial we touch upon the following topics:
Part I, intends to provide some background for those who want to deploy
DNSSEC.
Part II, about the aspects of DNSSEC that deal with data security.
 Creating an island of security (Chapter 2, "Conguring a recursive
name server to validate answers" and Chapter 3, "Securing a DNS
zone") by conguring a recursive name server to validate the signed
zones served by your organisations authoritative name servers. When
you have learnt and implemented this, you can be sure that DNS data
in your organisation is protected from change. Once you have created
an island of security it is a small step to become part of a chain of
trust.
 Delegating signing authority; building a chain of trust (Chapter 4,
"Delegating of signing authority; becoming globally secure"). You will
learn how to exchange keys with your parent and with your children.
 Chapter 5, "Rolling keys" covers maintaining keys and ensuring that
during the rollover process clients will be able to maintain a consistent
view of your DNS data.
 Part IV, covering aspects that deal with server to server security and
transaction security.
 Chapter 9, "Securing zone transfers" is on the use of transaction secu-
rity (TSIG) to provide authorisation and integrity for zone transfers.CONTENTS
Part III, describes a few tools that may turn out handy while guring out what
might have gone wrong.
The documentation is based on the so called DNSSEC-bis specications that
where nalised by the IETF DNSEXT working group in July 2004 and published
in March 2005 as [3, 5, 4].
As of June 2009 the author is aware of the following open-source and or
freeware implementations of the DNSSEC-bis specications: BIND, Unbound
and NSD. All our examples are based on BIND 9.6.1 and Unbound 1.3.0.
This document is not intended as an introduction to DNS. Basic knowledge
of DNS and acronyms used is assumed. We have tried not to use jargon but
when unavoidable we have tried to explain the meaning. If you want to know
more about the topic of DNS in general then Paul Albitz and Cricket Lui's[2] or
Ron Aitchinson's [1] text books provide an excellent introduction.
This document will be subject to change. Please regularly check http://
www.nlnetlabs.nl/dnssec_howto/dnssec_howto.pdf for new versions.
Your corrections and additions are appreciated.
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41 A MOTIVATION FOR DNSSEC
Part I
DNSSEC, the background
1 A motivation for DNSSEC
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of these essential elements that allowed
the Internet to evolve in what it is today.
It is used in almost every interaction that uses names in identiers: Email,
Web, SIP based Voice over IP, Web services, Spam ltering, Internet messaging,
and many more. Yet, the DNS system was not designed with security in mind;
over 3 decades ago the environment it was developed for (and in) just looked dif-
ferent. Regardless, given that the DNS is the largest distributed look-up system
on the Internet, one could claim that the protocol designers were successful.
The fact that essential components in the DNS architecture, so called caching
nameservers, are subject to types of attacks that allow the inception of false data
has been known for almost 2 decades now.
As a result of such so called cache poisoning attacks, e-mails can be redirected
and copied before they are delivered to their nal destination, voice over IP
calls can be tapped by third parties, and { given the circular dependency of the
registration process on the DNS { SSL certicates may not be as protective as
one would hope.
The DNS has become a utility that people depend on when moving about on
the Internet. It is a core part of the Internet Infrastructure and trust in the DNS
is necessary, albeit not sucient, for trust in the Internet.
DNSSEC was designed to deal with cache poisoning and a set of other DNS
vulnerabilities such as man in the middle attacks and data modication in au-
thoritative servers. Its major objective is to provide the ability to validate the
authenticity and integrity of DNS messages in such a way that tampering with
the DNS information anywhere in the DNS system can be detected. This is the
kind of protection the DNS desperately needs.
Unfortunately, because of the distributed nature of the DNS, DNSSEC needs
to be deployed by a signicant amount of DNS data providers before its utility
becomes relevant. Custodians of the DNS infrastructure such as TLDs and the
root system should provide a breeding ground on which DNSSEC can take o
while ISPs and enterprise DNS administrators prepare their DNS infrastructure
to validate signed data.
Obviously this is not going to be a project with immediate return on invest-
ment, it is a long term strategy to allow us to put similar trust in the Internet
as we did 10 years ago.
By introducing DNSSEC in your environment you do not only protect yourself
or the users of your data. But you also help in building a globally secure system
that can be used to bootstrap trust relations in other protocols.
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Part II
Securing DNS data
This part deals with securing data in zone les. We describe how to
generate and manage keys, how to set up a recursive name server to
validate signed zone data and how to sign and serve zones.
2 Conguring a recursive name server to validate answers
2.1 Introduction
We plan to congure a recursive name server to validate the data it receives.
Users that use this recursive name server as their resolver will, then, only receive
data that is either secure and validated or not secured in any way. As a result,
secured data that fails validation will not nd its way to the users1. Having
a validating recursive name server protects all those that use it as a forwarder
against receiving spoofed DNS data.
Figure 1 illustrates how to congure the recursive DNS servers with a trusted
key for "example.com" so that all the data served by the authoritative servers for
"example.com" is validated before it is handed to the protected infrastructure
that have the recursive servers congured as their forwarder (the name servers
that usually are assigned through DHCP or congured in /etc/resolv.conf).
By conguring a public key for a specic zone, we tell the caching forwarder
that all data coming from that zone should be signed with the corresponding
private key. The zone acts as a secure entry point into the DNS tree and the key
congured in the recursive name server acts as the start for a chain of trust. In
an ideal situation you have only one key congured as a secure entry point: the
key of the root zone.
We assume you have congured your BIND nameserver to be recursive only
or that you use UNBOUND, which is recursive only.
We also assume that that name server in your organisation has been con-
gured to run as an authoritative server for a secured zone called example.net.
Notes on how to set up a secured zone can be found below in Chapter 3, "Securing
a DNS zone"
2.2 Warning
Your recursive name server will treat the zones for which you congured trust
anchors as being secured. If the zones for which you have congured trust anchors
change their keys you will also have to recongure your trust anchors. Failure to
do so will result in the data in these zones, or any child, being marked as bogus
and therefore becoming invisible to users.
1As a result users can trust the data they are dealing with, provided that the path between
the validating recursive name server and the stub resolver can be trusted. On a shared network
such as an IEEE802.11 network this is not the case.
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Figure 1: DNS environment
2.3 Conguring the caching forwarder
See AppendixB for information on compiling BIND with the correct switches
to allow for DNSSEC. Do not forget enter the dnssec-enable yes; and
dnssec-validation yes; statements in the options directive of your named.conf.2
As an alternative to bind you could use UNBOUND as a DNSSEC aware re-
cursive nameserver. UNBOUND does not need any special conguration options
except for the conguration of a trust-anchor to perform DNSSEC validation.
2the dnssec-validation yes; directive is only needed in the version 9.4 series. It will be
the default for the 9.5 series of BIND
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2.3.1 Conguring a trust anchor
A trust anchor is a public key that is congured as the entry point for a chain
of authority. In the ideal case |where the root is signed and chains of trusts
can be constructed through top-level domains to end-nodes | validating name
servers would only need one of these trust anchors to be congured. During early
deployment you will probably want to congure multiple trust anchors.
Figure 2: Trust anchors in the DNS tree
In Figure 2 we show a zone tree. In this tree, the domains nlnetlabs.nl,
194.in-addr.arpa, 193.in-addr.arpa and 0.0.193.in-addr.arpa are as-
sumed to be signed. It is also assumed that there is a secure delegation between
193.in-addr.arpa and 0.0.193.in-addr.arpa. In order to validate all these
domains, the validating DNS client would have to congure trust anchors for
nlnetlabs.nl, 194.in-addr.arpa and 193.in-addr.arpa.3
2.3.2 How and where to get these trust anchors?
To congure a trust-anchor you have to obtain the public key of the zone that
you want to use as the start of the chain of authority that is to be followed when
the data is validated. It is possible to get these straight from from the DNS, but
there are two reasons why this may not be advisable.
3 Fetching and maintaining all these trust anchors in the absence of a signed root clearly
does not scale and is one of the problems that early deployers will have to deal with. BIND
9.3.2 contains a so called "look-aside" validation option that may help with this trust anchor
distribution issue. Also see section 2.6.
82 CONFIGURING A RECURSIVE NAME SERVER TO VALIDATE ANSWERS
Firstly, you have to establish the authenticity of the key you are about to
congure as your trust anchor. How you do this depends on on what method the
zone owner has made available for out of band validation of the key.
 You could do this by visiting the zone owners secure website and validate
the key information. For instance, the RIPE NCC signs a number of reverse
zones. They publish their public keys on through <https://www.ripe.
net/projects/disi/keys/>
 You could give the zone owner a call if you personally know them.
 You could trust the key that is published on the bill you just received from
the zone owner.
 You could just believe that your OS vendor did the validation on your
behalf.
Secondly, you may have a choice of public keys, in which case you need to
select the the proper "Secure Entry Point" key.
In DNSSEC a dierence is made between key- and zone-signing keys. Key-
signing keys exclusively sign the DNSKEY RR set at the apex, while zone-signing
keys sign all RR sets in a zone. 4. Key-signing keys are often used as Secure
Entry Points (SEP) keys. These SEP keys are the keys intended to be rst used
when building a chain of authority from a trust anchor to signed data. We advise
a one-to-one mapping between SEP keys and key-signing keys. In practise key-
signing keys have a lower rollover frequency than zone-signing keys so you should
congure the SEP i.e. key-signing keys.
In addition to having the proper public key you should either be aware of
the rollover policy of the zone owner, or that you have a tool that takes care of
automated rollover. Failure to modify the trust anchor before the corresponding
SEP key is rolled will result in validation failures.
Assume you have obtained the key-signing keys of nlnetlabs.nl., 193.in-addr.arpa.,
and 195.in-addr.arpa.. To congure those key as a trust anchor you will have
tell your recursive nameserver to use those. For both BIND and UNBOUND you
can follow the following procedure.
Create a separate le that contains the keys in a trusted-keys directive as
shown in gure 3. The format is similar to the DNSKEY RR except that the
"DNSKEY" label, the CLASS and the TTL, are omitted and quotes are placed
around the name and the public key material.
You can use the include statements in both UNBOUND and BIND to read
the les with the trusted keys directive into your conguration les.
2.3.3 Public repositories of trust-anchors
There are a few places where you can obtain trust-anchors.
The IANA ITAR (at https//itar.iana.org) is IANA's Interim Trust An-
chor Repository to share the key material required to perform DNSSEC
4For an example see gure 3.4 where the DNSKEY RRset is signed with two keys with key
id 17000 and 49656 and the other RRsets in the zone with the key with keyid 17000; the key
with keyid 17000 is the zone-signing key and the key with key id 49656 is the key-singing key
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// Trusted keys
// These are examples only, do not use in production
trusted-keys {
"nlnetlabs.nl." 3 5
"AQPzzTWMz8qSWIQlfRnPckx2BiVmkVN6LPupO3mbz7Fh
LSnm26n6iG9NLby97Ji453aWZY3M5/xJBSOS2vWtco2t
8C0+xeO1bc/d6ZTy32DHchpW6rDH1vp86Ll+ha0tmwyy
9QP7y2bVw5zSbFCrefk8qCUBgfHm9bHzMG1UBYtEIQ==";
"193.in-addr.arpa." 257 3 5
"AwEAAc2RnCT1gjU22FbNC1baMQec77fq60z2HlCKscYl
3idBZTp703ApMfAAFcMZQGkSmo8NP+47KqZJwG9ISLaT
bUais3khgFVrf7lIRzPJAMlXHsmOMmpq5xBORF66EDt/
u2dau3qqzOfb/BrKCklGgnwBosgqaSPmWBQTuzJFqzi3
4FQIt4xFHWYyt3B5qZ9h4dpUL96etvvx1N+z8tlXjhlm
Vauw1EPZnz2rmY6HEJFS2zjaI1FrDtY5/pooJjRWjobk
RXL3iqjd5J/cmDikxjQCjwnbwBS+YvcwZCos4n9Xh2l5
kf2kOcq9xCmZvEplfWJ9lWbVkfhpWaM8qXXPN8E=";
"195.in-addr.arpa." 257 3 5
"AwEAAaMN4kOrGaiHJBikvcf+mhPxzprL85Q40VA0hbRc
a8FDDn6Xlkuj95Nizy2vMrOy1MjIjo7a+GACGp6C/Rdj
6nDimsRrUBr/G/dq+zBgg8qvRXWJZhx+zNCgkfv9gs1B
eRlPnjXr1K/x5viTzQRDK3SYfHiCMVNxuYN+T7kniDLx
QRUI/ASF3YxqNQ+Oo+T5L6nYtO7uLeAUdxzToRdIHaey
iSnq52boA/3Yg6X8Kbo1uAUpeU4QDD7bOwq+obmaToLU
m/FvNUKx0l9U2P2ItcsqRCHQut/RxK2pj8GGRDCDco1J
5UAi7hiwP1eEWmbigbPnDQg++QDjegV39vTJQ2c=";
};
Figure 3: trust anchor conguration
verication of signed top-level domains, in lieu of a signed DNS root zone.
The tar publishes key information of TLDs, the exchange of information
between IANA and the TLDs is the same as would normally take place for
root-zone maintenance.
The UCLA secspider (at https://secspider.cs.ucla.edu) contains zones
that have been submitted by users (via the on-line submission form),
crawled from a large list of over 2.5 million zones, and walked (via NSEC
walking). Their collection of keys in a format that is understood by
Unbound and BIND is available at: http://secspider.cs.ucla.edu/
trust-anchors.conf.
The IKS Jena TAR (at https://www.iks-jena.de/leistungen/dnssec.php
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is build from scanning the DNS and by open registration, it is made avail-
able through DLV.
2.3.4 Testing
As soon as a trusted-key has been congured, data from that zone or its sub
zones will be validated by the caching forwarder. You can test this by querying
your server5. If data is validated by the caching forwarder the ad-bit will be set
by the name server (see the 'ags' in the following example).
; <<>> DiG 9.5.0-P2 <<>> @192.168.2.204 example.net SOA +dnssec +multiline +retry=1
; (1 server found)
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 1397
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 3
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;example.net. IN SOA
;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.net. 100 IN SOA ns.example.net. olaf.nlnetlabs.nl. (
2002050501 ; serial
100 ; refresh (1 minute 40 seconds)
200 ; retry (3 minutes 20 seconds)
604800 ; expire (1 week)
100 ; minimum (1 minute 40 seconds)
)
example.net. 100 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
TVgWsNQvsFmeNHAeccGi7+UI7KwcE9TXPuSvmV9yyJwo
4FvHkxVC1H+98EtrmbR4c/XcdUzdfgn+q+lBqNsnbAit
xFERwPxzxbX0+yeCdHbBjHe7OuOc2Gc+CH6SbT2lKwVi
iEx3ySqqNoVScoUyhRdnPV2A1LV0yd9GtG9mI4w= )
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.net. 100 IN NS ns.example.net.
example.net. 100 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
Xuw7saDDi6+5Z7SmtC7FC2npPOiE8F9qMR87eA0egG0I
B+xFx7pIogoVIDpOd1h3jqYivhblpCoDSBQb2oMbVy3B
SX5cF0r7Iu/xKP8XrV4DjNiugpa+NnhEIaRqG5uoPFbX
4cYT51yNq70I5mJvvajJu7UjmdHl26ZlnK33xps= )
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.example.net. 100 IN A 192.168.2.203
ns.example.net. 100 IN RRSIG A 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
YUj6wUw2hHpONnfN/rSJJaGve2NfA1TcROJV7FdKmXrk
Vn+gMp2pATijqKxG6nLMI/MnAs1bURYMMuBy6458y97v
0687s5ba2kaUwFgmV4UOn/TnAjwNBgSTkSK/TTGQVK3V
xw9uefiQprxG70Z1h6gLysWRgBc33JiQRvvn5nY= )
;; Query time: 5 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.2.204#53(192.168.2.204)
;; WHEN: Sat Jul 4 10:13:34 2009
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 639
5We use the bind supplied dig tool, alternatively you can use NLnet Labs' drill, see section 6
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It is important that you check that the validation is working correctly. This
can be done by using the BIND log facilities on the machine that is congured
as the validating recursive name server.
In BIND messages of a certain category can be logged to separate chan-
nels. The channels determine where the messages go and to what severity level
they will need to be reported. The relevant category for DNSSEC validation is
dnssec. In the example below the errors of the dnssec category are directed to
the dnssec log channel. In order to follow the validation process the channel
has to log at least severity debug 3.
logging {
channel dnssec_log { // a DNSSEC log channel
file "log/dnssec" size 20m;
print-time yes; // timestamp the entries
print-category yes; // add category name to entries
print-severity yes; // add severity level to entries
severity debug 3; // print debug message <= 3 t
};
category dnssec { dnssec_log; };
}
The output in the log le will look similar to the output below. The attempt
for positive response validation shows how the validator tries to prove that the
RR set is trusted by following the chain of trust to the appropriate secure entry
point, your trusted-key statement. Chains of trust (see gure 4) start by the
validation of a signature over a DNSKEY RRset, then these keys are used to
validate the DS RRset that point to DNSKEY RRs in a child zone { which
validates the DNSKEY RRs in the child zone {, or the DNSKEYs can be used
to validate the data you have queried for. The log reects the activity of the
validator following the chain of trust.
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: starting
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: starting
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=49656): success
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: signed by trusted key; marking as secure
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: resuming validate
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: verify rdataset (keyid=17000): success
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: marking as secure
validator @0x100823a00: dns_validator_destroy
122 CONFIGURING A RECURSIVE NAME SERVER TO VALIDATE ANSWERS
Figure 4: Chain of Trust
2.4 Finding trust-anchors
It is not trivial to nd and maintain trust anchors. If you want to get started with
validation of DNSSEC here are a few places where you can nd more information.
 RIPE NCC maintains a set of keys on their secured website under https:
//www.ripe.net/projects/disi/keys/index.html (Note that this is a
secured website, check the certicate).
 The Swedish TLD is signed. Its key can be found at https://dnssec.
nic.se/key.html. (Also check the certicate of this site).
 The DNSSEC spider tries to locate secured zones and checks their status.
You could use this site to nd secured zones. See http://secspider.cs.
ucla.edu/islands.html.
2.5 Maintaining Trust Anchors
Once trust anchors are congured you will need to make sure they are kept in
sync with the key as published by the entity responsible for the zone to which it
belongs.
Keeping in sync with trust anchors is incredibly important and while there is a
standard to signal rollovers([16]) it is not yet widely deployed. Once a maintainer
of a zone uses the RFC5011 mechanisms there are a number of tools to take care
of the rollover, e.g. the NLnet Labs autotrust tool at http://www.nlnetlabs.
nl/projects/autotrust/'.
More attention to the maintenance of trust anchors will be paid in a future
version of this HOWTO.
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2.6 Lookaside Validation
Remember gure 2. If you would like to validate all these islands you will have
to congure many trust-anchors, as in the example in gure 3.
In order to deal with this problem in absence of secure delegation from a
small set of trust-anchors (ideally only 1, the root), BIND supports, as of version
9.3.2, a 6 mechanism called lookaside validation [19, 18].
In the lookaside validation a DLV registry will maintain all the trust-anchors
you trust them to do the "Good Thing". The maintainers of zones that are secure
register their trust-anchors with the DLV registry and (non-standard extensions)
in BIND (as of 9.3.2) will allow you, operator of a validating nameserver, to make
use of all trust anchors that are present in the DLV tree.
In the DLV scheme the trust anchors are published in a dedicated domain
(dlv.isc.org in the gure 5). Whenever a validating resolver recognises that a
zone is signed it will rst try to validate it by assessing if it is within the island
of trust congured by its local trust anchors. When the validated domain is not
in a trusted island the resolver will lookup perform a lookup in the DLV domain
and use the trust anchor from that zone if and when available.
Figure 5: Trust anchors in the lookaside tree
6Authors opinion inserted here: I am not very enthusiastic about lookaside validation
Since anybody can, in theory, start a DLV registry it will very dicult to know who to trust
and to get a full picture of which zones are secured and which not. On the other hand it is
a mechanism to provide early deployment maximum benet. At some point this section may
disappear from the HOWTO.
At the moment of writing the author advises to use ISC's DLV registry.
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2.6.1 Conguring lookaside validation
What follows is a generic description if you want to congure ISC's DLV as your
authoritative lookaside domain you may want to read http://www.isc.org/
ops/dlv/.
In the example below we assume that dlv-registry.org is the registry of
our choice.
You have to perform two (additional) steps in order to turn on lookaside
validation.
Congure a trust anchor for the DLV registry. You do this by dening a
trust anchor for the island of trust dened by dlv-registry.org in named.conf.
Obviously, this trust-anchor is not exclusive, any trust-anchor congured in your
trusted-keys statement will have preference over the data in the DLV registry.
trusted-keys {
//
// this trust-anchor defines dlv-registry.org as a trusted island.
//
"dlv-registry.org." 257 3 5
"AQPXP7B3JTdPPhMl ... u82ggY2BKPQ==";
//
// Other trust anchors below.
//
"nlnetlabs.nl." 3 5
"AQPzzTWMz8qSWI ... zMG1UBYtEIQ==";
"193.in-addr.arpa." 257 3 5
"AwEAAc2RnCT1gj ... pWaM8qXXPN8E=";
"195.in-addr.arpa." 257 3 5
"AwEAAaMN4kOrGai ... DjegV39vTJQ2c=";
};
Conguring how the DNS name space anchors in the DLV name space. By
using the dnssec-lookaside statement in the options section of named.conf.
The statement takes two arguments the rst one is the domain in the DNS for
which lookaside validation is to be applied. Usually this will be the full name
space so the "." (root) is congured. The second argument is the name of the
trust-anchor where a lookup should be performed for a DLV record.
It is best to congure only one DLV trust-anchor.
options {
// DNSSEC should be turned on, do not forget
dnssec-enable yes;
dnssec-validation yes;
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// This sets the dlv registry "dlv-registry.org"
dnssec-lookaside "." trust-anchor "dlv-registry.org.";
// other options are skipped in this example
};
testing When you have your logging congured as described in section 2.3.4 i.e.
you log errors of the dnssec category are directed to a channel that logs at least
at severity debug 3, then your log output when querying for example.net
SOA will be similar to what is shown below.
First, the amount of log-ouput to validate one query covers more than one
page of ne print. On a production server this data for several validation se-
quences will be print mixed. It will be very hard to debug from logles on
production servers if you have not rst looked at what happens for a single
query.
Second, the structure is that the validator rst nds DNSSEC RRs, notices
that those records are not secure according 'plain DNSSEC' and then moves to
DLV validation.
Third, small chains of trust are build, from the DLV trust-anchor, via
DNSKEY RRs to the signatures over the data. Try to follow these trust an-
chors in the example output so it will be easier to identify them in production
logs.
validating @0x100824800: . NS: starting
validating @0x100824800: . NS: looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: . NS: plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (.): looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: . NS: looking for DLV dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100824800: . NS: DLV lookup: wait
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: starting
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: looking for DLV
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (.): looking for DLV
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: looking for DLV example.net.dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: DNS_R_COVERINGNSEC
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: covering nsec: trust 1
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: DLV lookup: wait
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: starting
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: attempting negative response validation
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: starting
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: starting
validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008e0400: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: starting
validating @0x1008e0400: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008e0400: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=8916): success
validating @0x1008e0400: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: signed by trusted key; marking as secure
validator @0x1008e0400: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: resuming validate
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org SOA: marking as secure
validator @0x1008de800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: in authvalidated
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming nsecvalidate
validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: in fetch_callback_validator
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validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming validate
validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008df600: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: marking as secure
validator @0x1008df600: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: in dlvfetched: success
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: DLV example.net found
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: dlv_validator_start
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: restarting using DLV
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: starting
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008de800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: marking as secure
validator @0x1008de800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: in authvalidated
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: looking for relevant nsec
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: nsec proves name exists (owner) data=0
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming nsecvalidate
validating @0x1008dda00: dlv-registry.org DLV: nonexistence proof(s) found
validator @0x1008dda00: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100824800: . NS: in dlvfetched: ncache nxrrset
validating @0x100824800: . NS: DLV not found
validating @0x100824800: . NS: marking as answer
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: starting
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (.): looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: looking for DLV example.net.dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: DLV example.net found
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: dlv_validator_start
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: restarting using DLV
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: dlv_validatezonekey
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: Found matching DLV record: checking for signature
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=17000): RRSIG failed to verify
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=49656): success
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: marking as secure
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: resuming validate
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: verify rdataset (keyid=17000): success
validating @0x100823a00: example.net SOA: marking as secure
validator @0x100823a00: dns_validator_destroy
When using lookaside validation assessing the log output in case of corrupted
zone data is a challenge. Below is the output of the validator when it tries to
gure out if a query that returns a corrupted result is valid or not. The conclusion
is reached in the last few lines.
validating @0x100824800: . NS: starting
validating @0x100824800: . NS: looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: . NS: plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (.): looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: . NS: looking for DLV dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100824800: . NS: DLV lookup: wait
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: starting
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: looking for DLV
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (.): looking for DLV
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: looking for DLV corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: DNS_R_COVERINGNSEC
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: covering nsec: trust 1
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validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: DLV lookup: wait
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: starting
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: attempting negative response validation
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: starting
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: starting
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: attempting negative response validation
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: starting
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008df200: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: starting
validating @0x1008df200: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008df200: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=8916): success
validating @0x1008df200: dlv-registry.org DNSKEY: signed by trusted key; marking as secure
validator @0x1008df200: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: resuming validate
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org SOA: marking as secure
validator @0x1008dc800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: in authvalidated
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming nsecvalidate
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: resuming validate
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008de400: dlv-registry.org SOA: marking as secure
validator @0x1008de400: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: in authvalidated
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming nsecvalidate
validating @0x1008de400: example.net.dlv-registry.org NSEC: starting
validating @0x1008de400: example.net.dlv-registry.org NSEC: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008de400: example.net.dlv-registry.org NSEC: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008de400: example.net.dlv-registry.org NSEC: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008de400: example.net.dlv-registry.org NSEC: marking as secure
validator @0x1008de400: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: in authvalidated
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: looking for relevant nsec
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: nsec range ok
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming nsecvalidate
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: in checkwildcard: *.example.net.dlv-registry.org
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: looking for relevant nsec
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: nsec range ok
validating @0x1008dd600: corrupt.example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: nonexistence proof(s) found
validator @0x1008dd600: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: in dlvfetched: ncache nxdomain
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: looking for DLV example.net.dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: DLV lookup: wait
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: starting
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x1008dc800: dlv-registry.org NSEC: marking as secure
validator @0x1008dc800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: in authvalidated
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: looking for relevant nsec
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: nsec proves name exists (owner) data=0
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: resuming nsecvalidate
validating @0x1008dba00: dlv-registry.org DLV: nonexistence proof(s) found
validator @0x1008dba00: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100824800: . NS: in dlvfetched: ncache nxrrset
validating @0x100824800: . NS: DLV not found
validating @0x100824800: . NS: marking as answer
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100824800: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: starting
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validating @0x100824800: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x100824800: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: verify rdataset (keyid=27467): success
validating @0x100824800: example.net.dlv-registry.org DLV: marking as secure
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: in dlvfetched: success
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: DLV example.net found
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: dlv_validator_start
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: restarting using DLV
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: starting
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: plain DNSSEC returns unsecure (.): looking for DLV
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: looking for DLV example.net.dlv-registry.org
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: DLV example.net found
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: dlv_validator_start
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: restarting using DLV
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: dlv_validatezonekey
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: Found matching DLV record: checking for signature
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=17000): RRSIG failed to verify
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=49656): success
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: marking as secure
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: resuming validate
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: verify rdataset (keyid=17000): RRSIG failed to verify
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: failed to verify rdataset
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: verify failure: RRSIG failed to verify
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: no valid signature found
validator @0x100823a00: dns_validator_destroy
2.7 Some Troubleshooting Tips
Suppose that you have congured a trust anchor and you are experiencing prob-
lems. For instance, your nameserver returns "SERVFAIL" for particular queries.
Well, "SERVFAIL" is the default return code that a validating nameserver re-
turns when it ags data as being bogus. Bogus data can be caused by two things.
Either you are under attack or you experiencing a conguration error either by
the operator of one of the zones in the chain of trust or by the operator of the
validating recursive nameserver.
In addition to looking at the logs there are a number of tools at your disposal
(see III). To assess if problems occur because of misconguration, or bugs, in
you validating nameserver, or because of problems with the signed zones you will
need a troubleshooting strategy.
One of the approaches you could take is to rst use drill (see 6) or dig (see
7) to perform a 'sigchase' or a 'trace' with a key copied to your local le system,
circumventing you validating recursive nameserver. In that way you will be able
to check if the chain of trust can actually be built from the data. Make sure you
use the correct trust-anchor when tracing data.
When you have veried that the chain of trust can be build from the data in
the DNS it is time to troubleshoot the validating nameserver. This is easy when
you have access to the log les but may be more troublesome if you don't. You
could use dig to query the validating nameservers with and without the +cd ag.
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That ag sets a bit in the query that instructs the nameserver not to perform
validation. When the individual pieces in the chain of trust (drill returned
those when using the trace option) you may be able to nd inconsistencies that
indicate that an expired trust anchor has been congured. You start by querying
the DNSKEY RRset for which you assume there is a trust-anchor considered and
work your way down. Or, alternatively, you query for the data you were looking
for, use the data in the RRSIG RR to nd for which DNSKEY RR to query,
then query for a DS RR at the same name and work your way up (similar to the
'sigchase' in drill).
While troubleshooting there are a number of failures that are easily intro-
duced. Take the following example.
In his ISP column [9, 8, 7], Geo Huston documented his experiences as an
early deployer. He blindly congured a trust-anchor for the "nlnetlabs.nl" zone.
While this zone was signed it was done in an experimental setup whereby not all
servers for the zone were congured with the same version of the protocol. In this
case one of the servers would not provide RRSIGs with the answer, something
which may give rise to re-occurring but hard to predict failures.
There are two things to learn from this: Never blindly congure trust anchors
in validating resolvers and make sure that when you serve zones all your servers
conform to the DNSSEC protocol specication.
Another failure is that one of the RRsets in the chain of trust has expired
signatures. Check this by looking at the date elds in the RRSIG RRs.
More problematic to nd may be a rollover, where DNSKEY RRs or RRSIG
RRs have been removed to early so that there is an inconsistency between data
in cache and data that needs to be validated (also see section 5). Using the +cd
to with dig and looking at the TTLs might help to distinguish if you are trying
to validate RRSIGs for which there are no DNSKEYs available (or vice verse).
3 Securing a DNS zone
3.1 Introduction
If a zone has been signed and its key has been congured in a validating recursive
name server we usually refer to it as being an "island of security". It apparently
does not have a secured parent and stands alone in the sea of other unsecured do-
mains. Usually creating an "island of security" is the rst step to becoming part
of the secure DNS. The "island of security" will remain "insecure" for resolvers
that have no trust anchor congured for the domain.
If a zone owner decides to create "an island of security" she will sign her zones
and distribute the "secure entry points" to the system administrators that want
to validate her zone data. Once the island of security has been set up the island
can become part of the secure tree by exchanging the "secure entry point" with
the parent.
After creation of the key-pairs used for signing and validation we want to
sign the zone data for our own organisation (e.g. example.net.) and congure
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the caching forwarders on our organisations network to validate data against the
public key of our organisation.
In the text below, we assume that your organisation's domain names are
maintained in one zone. If domain name administration is delegated to sub-
zones, see section Chapter 4, "Delegating of signing authority; becoming globally
secure".
Signing the zone data is the task of the zone administrator, conguring the
caching forwarder is a task of system administrators.
The examples are based on the example zone in section Figure 7.
3.2 Conguring authoritative servers
All the authoritative servers will need to be congured to deal with the DNSSEC
protocol. How this is done for BIND is explained in AppendixB. The essential
steps are compiling bind with openssl and enabling dnssec through the use of the
dnssec-enable yes; directive in the options section of named.conf.
That is all there is to it.
3.3 Creating key pairs
3.3.1 Key Maintenance Policy
Before generating keys, you will need to think about your key maintenance policy.
Such policy should address
 What will be the sizes of your keys?
 Will you separate the key- and zone-signing keys functionality?
 How often will you roll the keys?
 How will system administrators that intend to use your zone as a trust
anchor get hold of the appropriate public key and what mechanism will
you provide to enable them to validate the authenticity of your public key?
 How will you signal a key rollover or how can you make sure that all inter-
ested parties are aware of a rollover?
Some of these issues may be easy to address. For example, your organisation
may have established mechanisms to distribute the public keys, there may be
obvious ways to publish an upcoming rollover such as the possibility of publishing
the event in a corporate newspaper. Alternatively, it may be possible to notify all
relevant parties by mail when a corporate X.509 hierarchy is available for e-mail
validation.
3.3.1.1 Key- and zone-signing keys. The author thinks it is good practise to
use zone-signing keys and key-signing keys (also see Chapter 5, "Rolling keys").
The key-signing keys are usually the rst keys from your zone that are used to
build a chain of authority to the data that needs to be validated. Therefore,
these keys are often called a secure entry point key (or SEP key). These SEP
keys are the ones that you should exchange with your parents or that validating
resolvers congure as their trust anchors.
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Throughout this document we assume that you use separate key- and zone-
signing keys and that the key-signing keys are exclusively used as secure entry
point keys and can be identied by the SEP[11] bit in the ag eld; the ag eld
is odd.
3.3.2 Creating the keys
Usage:
dnssec-keygen -a alg -b bits [-n type] [options] name
Version: 9.5.0-P2
Required options:
-a algorithm: RSA | RSAMD5 | DH | DSA | RSASHA1 | HMAC-MD5 | HMAC-SHA1 | HMAC-SHA224 | HMAC-SHA256 | HMAC-SHA384 | HMAC-SHA512
-b key size, in bits:
RSAMD5: [512..4096]
RSASHA1: [512..4096]
DH: [128..4096]
DSA: [512..1024] and divisible by 64
HMAC-MD5: [1..512]
HMAC-SHA1: [1..160]
HMAC-SHA224: [1..224]
HMAC-SHA256: [1..256]
HMAC-SHA384: [1..384]
HMAC-SHA512: [1..512]
-n nametype: ZONE | HOST | ENTITY | USER | OTHER
(DNSKEY generation defaults to ZONE
name: owner of the key
Other options:
-c <class> (default: IN)
-d <digest bits> (0 => max, default)
-e use large exponent (RSAMD5/RSASHA1 only)
-f keyflag: KSK
-g <generator> use specified generator (DH only)
-t <type>: AUTHCONF | NOAUTHCONF | NOAUTH | NOCONF (default: AUTHCONF)
-p <protocol>: default: 3 [dnssec]
-s <strength> strength value this key signs DNS records with (default: 0)
-r <randomdev>: a file containing random data
-v <verbose level>
-k : generate a TYPE=KEY key
Output:
K<name>+<alg>+<id>.key, K<name>+<alg>+<id>.private
Figure 6: dnssec-keygen arguments
dnssec-keygen is the tool that we use to generate key pairs. The arguments
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that we have to provide dnssec-keygen are shown in Figure 6.
The output can be found in two les. The name of the les contain relevant
information:
Kdomain name+algorithm id+key id.extension
The domain name is the name specied on the command line. It is used by
other BIND DNSSEC tools, if you use a dierent name from the domain name,
you might confuse those tools. The algorithm id identies the algorithm used:
1 for RSAMD5, 3 for DSA, 5 for RSASHA1 and 54 for HMAC-MD5 (TSIG
only). The key id is an identier for the key material. This key id is used by
the RRSIG Resource Record. The extension is either key or private, the rst
is the public key, the second is the private key.
We create an RSASHA1 zone-signing key pair for example.net:
# dnssec-keygen -r/dev/random -a RSASHA1 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.net
Kexample.net.+005+17000
Because of the considerations in Section 3.3.1 you will also need to create
SEP keys. Create keys with the SEP bit set by specifying the -f KSK ag with
dnssec-keygen.
# dnssec-keygen -r/dev/random -f KSK -a RSASHA1 -b 1280 -n ZONE example.net
Kexample.net.+005+49656
Lets have a look at the content of these les7
cat Kexample.net.+005+17000.key
example.net. IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
AQPI4+0M1V055RS2Hqv+8w8V20Dh+SQmFzHQtZMuzLH3UxWE0GmG5Gfj
ijandJeAZTKLpERXB6RfHTHGG8lD3IO1azWN6DiVFEVzgr0otAdDonfY
+oEsRw== )
The public key (.key extension) is exactly as it appears in your zone le.
Note, that the TTL value is not specied. This key has a "ag" value of 256.
Since this value is an even number, the key is not marked as a SEP key and
should be used for zone-signing.
The private key (.private extension) contains all the parameters that make
an RSASHA1 private key. The private key of a RSA key contains dierent
parameters to DSA. Here is the private key (with base64 material truncated):
cat Kexample.net.+005+17000.private
Private-key-format: v1.2
Algorithm: 5 (RSASHA1)
7 We slightly edited the output for readability. We printed the base64 material over several
lines and introduced the brackets so that this is a legal multi-line representation of a RR.
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Modulus: yOPtDNVdOeUUth6r/vMPFdtA4fkkJhcx0LWTLsyx91MVhNBphu...
PublicExponent: Aw==
PrivateExponent: he1Iszjo0UNjJBRyqfdfY+eAlqYYGWTL4HkMyd3L+j...
Prime1: +X0kNW1JrepBnVw5o9fDUyWAT5zqxKt0YR4vJZ19991tLZAmdO4...
Prime2: ziIX5qfpZGBuzfd847TqtDfYcwv5UfUrPAIa/11g3leUUNERmsB...
Exponent1: plNtePOGc/GBE5LRF+Us4hkANRNHLcei62l0w75T+pOeHmAZ...
Exponent2: iWwP7xqbmEBJ3qT97SNHIs/logf7i/jHfVa8qj5AlDpi4Ith...
Coefficient: rmmgD9P7/ywQJ4F0epdGqOUoQZmqrPQsraDTD8vkU1wLju...
This private key should be kept secure8 i.e. the le permissions should be set
so that the zone administrator will be able to access them when a zone needs to
be signed. The BIND tools will, by default,9 look for the keys in the directory
where signing is performed (see Section 3.4), that might not be the most secure
place on your OS.
3.4 Zone-signing
When you create key pairs, you should include them in your zone le. Refer to
the example in Figure7, where we use the $include directive to include the keys.
We increase the serial number in the SOA record before signing.
In the example below we will use the RSASHA1 type keys for zone and key-
signing keys.
Once the key is included in the zone le we are ready to sign the zone using
the dnssec-signzone tool (see Figure 8 for all the arguments). We use the -o
ag to specify the origin of the zone; by default the origin is deduced from the
zone le name.
With the '-k key name' we specify which key is to be used as the key-signing
key. That key will only sign the DNSKEY RR set in the apex of the zone. The
keys that come as arguments at the end of the command are used to sign all
the RR data for which the zone is authoritative. If you do not specify the keys,
BIND will use the ones for which the public keys are included in the zone and
use the SEP ag to distinguish between key- and zone-signing keys.
In practise you would not want to rely on the default, since in key rollover
scenarios you will have a public key in your zone le but you would not want to
use that for zone-signing (in order to avoid double signatures and therefore longer
signature generation times and more resource consumption on your name server).
Below is the command issued to sign a zone with the 49656 key as key-signing
key and the 17000 key as zone-signing key.
/usr/local/sbin/dnssec-signzone \
-o example.net \
-k Kexample.net.+005+49656 \
db.example.net \
8 At the RIPE NCC we are working on a dedicated signing server that has SSH based
access control. Based on which key is used to login, a dedicated shell is opened; A zone
maintenance shell allows signing of zones; A key maintenance shell for key maintenance. Only
system administrators can access the key-material itself. A beta version of this tool is available
on RIPE NCC's website <http:www.ripe.net/disi/dnssec_maint_tool/>.
9 It is possible to fully specify the path to the keys.
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; example.net zone
;
$TTL 100
$ORIGIN example.net.
@ 100 IN SOA ns.example.net. (
olaf.nlnetlabs.nl.
2002050501
100
200
604800
100
)
NS ns.example.net.
ns.example.net. A 192.168.2.203
a A 192.168.2.1
b A 192.168.2.2
* A 192.168.2.10
b.a A 192.168.2.11
; These are the keys that need to be publised in the DNSKEY RRset
;
$include Kexample.net.+005+17000.key ; ZSK
$include Kexample.net.+005+49656.key ; KSK
Figure 7: example.net example zone
Kexample.net.+005+17000.key
The signed zone le is reproduced in gure 3.4 . Note that the apex DNSKEY
RRset is the only RRset with two signatures, made with the zone- and key-signing
keys. The other RRsets are only signed with the zone-signing keys.
The signing process completed the following:
 Sorted the zone in 'canonical' order10.
 Inserted NSEC records for every label.
 Added the key-id as a comment to each DNSKEY-record.
 Signed the DNSKEY RR set with two keys; the key-signing key and the
zone-signing key.
 Signed the other RRs with the zone-signing key.
10 A specic ordering as dened by the DNSSEC protocol.
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 It created two les, dsset-example.net and keyset-example.net. These
two les are relevant when building a chain of trust. Per default the les
are created in the 'current directory' i.e. the directory in which you ran
thednssec-signzone command, but when specifying the -d, with its di-
rectory, then the les end up there.
The signatures were created with a default life time of 30 days from the
moment of signing. Once signatures have expired data can not be validated and
your zone will marked 'bogus'. Therefore you will have to re-sign your zone
within 30 days. Zone re-signing is discussed below.
The signed zone is stored in db.example.net.signed, make sure you have
congured named to use this le to serve the zones from.
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Usage:
dnssec-signzone [options] zonefile [keys]
Version: 9.5.0-P2
Options: (default value in parenthesis)
-c class (IN)
-d directory
directory to find keyset files (.)
-g: generate DS records from keyset files
-s [YYYYMMDDHHMMSS|+offset]:
RRSIG start time - absolute|offset (now - 1 hour)
-e [YYYYMMDDHHMMSS|+offset|"now"+offset]:
RRSIG end time - absolute|from start|from now (now + 30 days)
-i interval:
cycle interval - resign if < interval from end ( (end-start)/4 )
-j jitter:
randomize signature end time up to jitter seconds
-v debuglevel (0)
-o origin:
zone origin (name of zonefile)
-f outfile:
file the signed zone is written in (zonefile + .signed)
-I format:
file format of input zonefile (text)
-O format:
file format of signed zone file (text)
-N format:
soa serial format of signed zone file (keep)
-r randomdev:
a file containing random data
-a: verify generated signatures
-p: use pseudorandom data (faster but less secure)
-t: print statistics
-n ncpus (number of cpus present)
-k key_signing_key
-l lookasidezone
-z: ignore KSK flag in DNSKEYs
Signing Keys: (default: all zone keys that have private keys)
keyfile (Kname+alg+tag)
Figure 8: dnssec-signzone arguments
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; File written on Sat Jul 4 10:13:30 2009
; dnssec\_signzone version 9.5.0-P2
example.net. 100 IN SOA ns.example.net. olaf.nlnetlabs.nl. (
2002050501 ; serial
100 ; refresh (1 minute 40 seconds)
200 ; retry (3 minutes 20 seconds)
604800 ; expire (1 week)
100 ; minimum (1 minute 40 seconds)
)
100 RRSIG SOA 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
TVgWsNQvsFmeNHAeccGi7+UI7KwcE9TXPuSv
mV9yyJwo4FvHkxVC1H+98EtrmbR4c/XcdUzd
fgn+q+lBqNsnbAitxFERwPxzxbX0+yeCdHbB
jHe7OuOc2Gc+CH6SbT2lKwViiEx3ySqqNoVS
coUyhRdnPV2A1LV0yd9GtG9mI4w= )
100 NS ns.example.net.
100 RRSIG NS 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
Xuw7saDDi6+5Z7SmtC7FC2npPOiE8F9qMR87
eA0egG0IB+xFx7pIogoVIDpOd1h3jqYivhbl
pCoDSBQb2oMbVy3BSX5cF0r7Iu/xKP8XrV4D
jNiugpa+NnhEIaRqG5uoPFbX4cYT51yNq70I
5mJvvajJu7UjmdHl26ZlnK33xps= )
100 NSEC *.example.net. NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
100 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
aDLo8JH5jEqD9u3Ft+7CNF8YXM9LKLKcDsLv
otIcpixsMSXlXFSZOIkxkxZtwlqBwhz0nzIs
7M/tnvsTlf14I5nt/VPRBY/XxanOa/3GjXLo
5Ukig8gX4S7s6/iTHNIFjJaxHiCtt5zwoI/H
TeKi9FjuH9ysHVuoHeYR06MN/LU= )
100 DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
AQPI4+0M1V055RS2Hqv+8w8V20Dh+SQmFzHQ
tZMuzLH3UxWE0GmG5GfjijandJeAZTKLpERX
B6RfHTHGG8lD3IO1azWN6DiVFEVzgr0otAdD
onfYF8gUT03ZnRcXlkJk41h12NOfq6rkODaF
nfMHCppI3WZ/MJqe+9hLJtis+oEsRw==
) ; key id = 17000
100 DNSKEY 257 3 5 (
AQOzgs4qea+ImJ1OCworkabHqFnvPKybVT7b
nDIkJ2HvXWslbwNWJ66Ox3N6ftpCTc9wWBMw
5+xOh7ilTwFPruMa2gURwEywZaMG9ipILOXm
KO4a5I+8R2QTH4BM0WaIKnv5jCHose/l9LL3
Y8MApsjP6gOWNM8b9aVTjBFnf0xEF7sOSBBB
E4G2/og5Fr+H8DYaotqgJ3nrzRfYA0gSXwwb
) ; key id = 49656
100 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
Figure 9: Example of a signed zone le
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20090704071330 17000 example.net.
VQb1OdYAFpDk9kBPqkvuHL4W+e1Ulo/QzIOD
7EyeZfJHNYW8bGhyNY5uaXnf3o/tBE6tj8mY
1kmRJsBWQXdSjRlW3syaZD7+W93m3rS6/reI
9hBAijy2xSEEVx1LTeeLu1qzzD0HMootC/cw
DuWSISPcS+9YB0sUbVsGQdzxn7E= )
100 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 49656 example.net.
TpWicKxjdD5NML8pT+t1moSOGDQF+Nl4AbeO
oAher5Q8QCrx2JBiKcyi5iaTHZyg6RizFLPW
+FxfcSaMmzk0030Zu0ILlZwOAWUv4gxdmoBe
MQQ/4tuZp6Dgsh7OLl+3dU+S0QihyQUXDnkt
MKARs10tBGpuIkzpKJFBY5eEAsV9ivlXx1Wi
zrY4vMkth6NuasmpKJ0BYaonHUMwK8NzAQ== )
*.example.net. 100 IN A 192.168.2.10
100 RRSIG A 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
U6uEoNwJVPFcPgfoloQfDTMgGjqeLijMqr7Q
RlPufDoy6SEYswoJWBk1mqo1cCCkN05lNqmr
XD6Nr4Q6gRV/F8x41KiV+U1u0+bnV6yog5CM
XFudPKnrMJC4Cr9mzmUfeiqX3yaKjqr46noE
37B1KrmcjJAlTIuVbLJ2dyPMxvo= )
100 NSEC a.example.net. A RRSIG NSEC
100 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
hYQV/LI/Uo2uCTAlXigo0tmuxiFH+MNUL265
hsNY3CHcdy4qJWV/fnAjPaNcA/oQMnhqfnWT
JBjp6RqPlTUZHKMPx1R7UbSPQSpI35lt5niE
xDQS5LHH4H+tzuV+HazcBR9rqLhEncPqgVmq
qIpsQRiJlMYnpN2bSjsdoqlJOrM= )
a.example.net. 100 IN A 192.168.2.1
100 RRSIG A 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
MughSVso2OhRNFgUmI0iFmovjot4o0ZPTPnt
dZ/ef8WJoi2fCXutgz3nvQlQbWrI7sLetyCD
9oKZN15wISDW4inkrWqwT5RLvo5iagXfn7wv
CzZflPqYoDYD3XDfAbxzjlF5X8HiZQmQnQU2
PNOaVRj9I5OeiKBRKJaNPCTKXGU= )
100 NSEC b.a.example.net. A RRSIG NSEC
100 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
rO/aVFfYOUyk8NtiOAs2ypWuSarINWXedIoW
FTpeo3uUih900re52vlFMRay+ZanASfSS837
ic9SIVcZz3DpFhlIuDgsSEFNOzvEwptUnvCC
osDS6vgF0ZyxTW3SD4VNIStRlmxqoBD8S3kV
OxqJ0yoL0nBpskQ2UOzLawolIh4= )
b.a.example.net. 100 IN A 192.168.2.11
100 RRSIG A 5 4 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
SiYt5SIoXwmR83oxjg/rT8KzdciE8UW4tv0c
Figure 9: continued
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B3Yl4+wFsQNb0M5pDBBP4Z2WIs+FDaP3xW7x
jFHuZyAl85yY0W6jP8nwWeNcvHcAAmhzYRT7
Isn2PKU92832xoIG9kF9Z3A6p3s= )
100 NSEC b.example.net. A RRSIG NSEC
100 RRSIG NSEC 5 4 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
KKIwCnO6wrYueT9ReasVJEXBYlhjoii/QB+7
cJAGpsxmV7dIgd2jEp8PTmdRaW6aYIPBn3nR
tIzhyNorFhocEVyBqAuPF7D58QJcJy78PA1W
6WG/5vGOWLKGMwWnLn1zBPcqifPC9BiQTyeU
dVASF1x+aN2QFZCKLGHAatwloG8= )
b.example.net. 100 IN A 192.168.2.2
100 RRSIG A 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
OnXyjrZUOnfW9byUBdHQbsx1JaWWZTHTmjoA
59zCJDSlp8Ez/+UIoBHPfrxRMt//yRtIDjT0
fDacjTKVJ6YeRLmCEwCptYGp9MtqoL5xlleH
GD/Awido8GrWfGsBEr7GUbcgPKDCeNnVzyok
PnG5YAG5ZilgOJh9PXijFGIHcxY= )
100 NSEC ns.example.net. A RRSIG NSEC
100 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
H/gWsA+mkx6M5jwfyAuC8fWDOUHHktnLFHO2
dNC1d23uWcZEV5DGbuQy9rcn8ikOmrFi0ABZ
gwufEAiARCdOgsCkNvkSzh2vprC2hYRZ3Hxt
CNtMsDobKontj7+lGv68V0wYY/se/38QMIYS
qTkEbokTpgaQRVku48kPLbvpObU= )
ns.example.net. 100 IN A 192.168.2.203
100 RRSIG A 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
YUj6wUw2hHpONnfN/rSJJaGve2NfA1TcROJV
7FdKmXrkVn+gMp2pATijqKxG6nLMI/MnAs1b
URYMMuBy6458y97v0687s5ba2kaUwFgmV4UO
n/TnAjwNBgSTkSK/TTGQVK3Vxw9uefiQprxG
70Z1h6gLysWRgBc33JiQRvvn5nY= )
100 NSEC example.net. A RRSIG NSEC
100 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 100 20090803071330 (
20090704071330 17000 example.net.
NYwhLV0hgDLoHPRruKKM3QibpFX57R647/Ui
BTeetEyz675LvkncHkc16HDcVQTzvHs+6xZC
jCyauBwxcPWDVQQcZ/zakgl8pUh73w1I6lH9
UHLlaFi+GMHfsH+jbdoNJ0wKzjNAP54hmOoM
0VPr11wlTFZhBAsb776sHu1CWL4= )
Figure 9: continued
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3.5 Caching forwarder conguration
Now the DNS servers publish signed data, we need to congure the 'clients' to
validate it. The clients in this context are recursive name servers. Just congure
your recursive name server with the public SEP key generated for the zone. This
is described in Section 2.3 (above), also see Figure 3.
3.6 Zone Re-Signing
When the signatures in your zone are due to expire or if you have added new
records to your zone, you will have to re-sign your zone. There are two ways
to re-sign your zone data. You may choose either option depending on levels of
automation, the zone size and the frequency with RRSIG RRs are generated.
 You can regenerate the signed zone from the unsigned zone le. The signer
will need to sort the zone again, generate all the NSEC records and generate
all RRSIG records.
If you generate your zone le from a back-end database this is probably the
preferred method.
 You can add the new records to the already signed zone le and then run
that zone le through the signer. The BIND signer will insert new records
and associate NSECs in the already sorted zone le and will only sign new
records and records for which the signatures are reaching the end of their
validity period.
You should build tools to maintain your signed zones e.g.: using cron, perl
and make. (also see Appendix F)
3.7 Troubleshooting Signed Zones
You can check the format of your named.conf using the named-checkconf pro-
gram. The named-checkzone program can be used to check zone les. These
programs use the same routines to parse the conguration and zone les as named
but only check syntax.
One can use dig and a name server congured with a trusted-key to validate
ones setup. If data cannot be cryptographically validated, the forwarder will
return with a SERVFAIL status. You can test this by intentionally corrupting
a resource record in the signed zone le. This is typical output of dig when
querying for corrupted data 11:
; <<>> DiG 9.5.0-P2 <<>> @192.168.2.204 corrupt.example.net A +dnssec +multiline +retry=1
; (1 server found)
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 18883
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
11 We corrupted the data by modifying rdata in the signed zone-le to generate this example
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; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;corrupt.example.net. IN A
;; Query time: 6 msec
;; SERVER: 192.168.2.204#53(192.168.2.204)
;; WHEN: Sat Jul 4 10:13:39 2009
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 48
Note that a caching forwarder will not do cryptographic validation of the
zones for which it is authoritative. Therefore, if your caching forwarder is a
primary or secondary server for a particular zone you will always get an answer
as it is assumed that data from disk is secure.
Further troubleshooting needs to be done on a a server congured as a val-
idating recursive name server. Below is an example of the log output of the
validating nameserver when we queried for corrupted data.
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: starting
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: starting
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: attempting positive response validation
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: verify rdataset (keyid=49656): success
validating @0x100824800: example.net DNSKEY: signed by trusted key; marking as secure
validator @0x100824800: dns_validator_destroy
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: in fetch_callback_validator
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: keyset with trust 7
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: resuming validate
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: verify rdataset (keyid=17000): RRSIG failed to verify
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: failed to verify rdataset
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: verify failure: RRSIG failed to verify
validating @0x100823a00: corrupt.example.net A: no valid signature found
validator @0x100823a00: dns_validator_destroy
(This output was generated by using the dnssec category to a logging channel
with severity debug 3; congured.)
Similarly one can use the logs produced by unbound for troubleshooting.
When setting verbosity: 3 then the log les are very verbose but also tell us
precisely what went wrong. Like in the excerpt of a log le below.
info: resolving (init part 3): <example.net. DNSKEY
info: processQueryTargets: <example.net. DNSKEY
info: sending query: <example.net. DNSKEY
debug: sending to target: <example.net.>
debug: cache memory msg=298385 rrset=306734 infra=11248
debug: iterator[module 1] operate: extstate:module_wait_reply
info: iterator operate: query <example.net. DNSKEY
info: response for <example.net. DNSKEY
info: reply from <example.net.>
info: query response was
info: finishing processing for <example.net. DNSKEY
debug: validator[module 0] operate: extstate:module_wait_module
info: validator operate: query <example.net. DNSKEY
info: validated DNSKEY <example.net. DNSKEY
debug: validator[module 0] operate: extstate:module_wait_subquery
info: validator operate: query <corrupt.example.net. A
debug: verify: signature
info: validator: response has failed ANSWER rrset: <corrupt.example.net. A
info: Validate: message contains bad
debug: cache memory msg=298750 rrset=307821 infra=11248
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3.8 Possible problems
SOA serial If you forget to increase the serial number before re-signing your
zone, secondary servers may not pick up the new signatures. This may
cause some of the authoritative servers to time out so some resolvers will
be able to validate your signature while others will not.
'Zone-signing key' rollover If a zone administrator makes a distinction be-
tween zone and key-signing keys then the rollover of a zone-signing key
will not involve any action from the administrators of the validators. If a
key-signing key is to be changed care should be taken that all resolvers in
the organisation have been supplied with a new trusted-key.
If the zone is only locally secured (i.e. is not part of a chain of trust) then
the rollover of a key-signing key is relatively simple. Remember that to
validate data there has to be at least one signature that can be validate
with the trusted-keys in resolvers. For a limited time you use two key-
signing keys to sign your zone: the old and new key. During that time
you start reconguring the resolvers in your organisation with new trusted-
keys. Once all resolvers have the new key congured in their trusted-key>
statement, the zones should be signed with the new key only.
Also see Chapter 5, "Rolling keys".
Slave server problems Slave servers will need to run code that is DNSSEC
enabled if one of the authoritative servers for a zone is not DNSSEC aware.
Problems may arise for the DNS client that tries to fetch data from those
DNSSEC oblivious servers.
The load on all your name servers will increase. Zone les, memory and
bandwidth consumption will grow. Factors 2-5 are not uncommon; See
"Hints and tips" for some numbers.
3.9 Automating the signing process
In june 2009 I am aware of two open source tools for the key maintenance and
zone signing. Both are still under development.
Open-DNSSEC (at http://www.opendnssec.org/ was created as an open-
source turn-key solution for DNSSEC. It secures zone data just before it is
published in an authoritative name server.
OpenDNSSEC takes in unsigned zones, adds the signatures and other
records for DNSSEC and passes it on to the authoritative name servers
for that zone.
DNS is complicated, and so is digital signing; their combination in DNSSEC
is of course complex as well. The idea of OpenDNSSEC is to handle such
diculties, to relieve the administrator of them after a one-time eort for
setting it up.
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The storage of keys is done through a PKCS #11 standard interface. To
deploy OpenDNSSEC, an implementation of this interface is needed, for
example a software library, an HSM or perhaps a simpler token.
DNSSHIM (at http://registro.br/dnsshim/index-EN.html) an open-source
software that implements the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol for
the Internet. Its main feature is to work as a Hidden Master nameserver
providing information only to authoritative slave servers. Furthermore,
DNSSHIM has the ability to manage, store and automatically resign zones
using the security extension DNSSEC.
More about open-dnssec in a future version of the HOWTO.
4 Delegating of signing authority; becoming globally se-
cure
This section is subject to change as the tools needed are currently being modi-
ed/developed.
4.1 Introduction
We have covered how to deploy DNSSEC in a single zone. We now want to build
a chain of trust, so that once a client has securely obtained a public key high
in the DNS hierarchy, it can follow the chain to validate data in your or your
children's zones.
During the validation process a resolver will start from a congured trust
anchor. It will use that to validate the keys set at the apex of the zone. Once
the key-set has been validated the keys in that key-set can be used to validate
any other data in a zone, such as A, AAAA and PTR resource records. In order
to trust a child zone the validator will follow a pointer, stored in the DS resource
record, that points to a key in the child's key-set that will be used to validate the
keys in that zone. That DS RR is signed by the parents zone-signing-key and
points to the child's key-signing key (gure 4).
4.2 Practical steps
Below we will describe how to set up a zone that is globally secure based on the
parental signature over the DS record pointing to the child key-signing key.
In the example we use net as parent and example.net as child. At the
start of the process we assume that the parent zone is already locally secure but
has not secured the delegation yet. This means that the parent has no DS RR
for example.net. and that resolvers following the chain of trust via net. will
treat the example.net. zone as variably insecure. The example.net. zone is
assumed not to be secure. Much of the procedure will be similar to Chapter 3,
"Securing a DNS zone", but, since key-sets are used, some details are dierent.
Our goal is to publish a parent zone with a DS RR. The DS RR is related to
the key singing key as generated by the child (the DS RR contains a cryptographic
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hash over data in the DNSKEY RR). Therefore, the child needs to send some
information to the parent. To ease the process BIND introduces key-sets and
ds-sets.
A key-set is a small le, with the same syntax as a zone le, that contains
one or more key-signing keys of the child. The ds-set is also a similar le but this
le contains the DS RR that is to be included in the parent zone. These les are
created when signing a zone as described in Section 3.4. For for the example.net
zone they will be called dsset-example.net and keyset-example.net.
There are many imaginable ways to get the key-set to the parent. For instance
 the child sends a mail (cryptographically signed, to allow for integrity and
authentication checks) with either the ds-set or the key-set.
 the parent can fetch the appropriate key from the child's DNS and create
a key-set le itself. This is done by putting the key material in a le called
keyset-child-domainname.
 a web based registration system interface is used to acquire the key-set.
In an operational environment it is extremely important that the authenticity
and the integrity of the DNSKEY is established. The zone administrator 12 of the
parent will need to validate that the key came from the zone administrator of the
child zone. If possible, this should be conrmed by an out-of-DNS mechanism.
The parent could use a customers database to validate if the key was actually
sent by the zone administrator. If a wrong key is signed the child zone will be
vulnerable for attacks; signing the wrong key breaks DNSSEC.
The parent stores the key-sets in the directory where zone les are stored,
or, when you want to maintain some le system hygiene, in a directory that is
to be specied with the -d ag of dnssec-signzone. The signzone tool will
automatically generate (or include) the appropriate DS records if the -g ag is
provided and a keyset-child-domainname (or the ds-set) is found. Although
the key-set generated by the child contains signatures the RRSIG RRs do not
need to be available in the keyset-child-domain le at the parent, the sign tool
will not perform signature validation.
Below is an example of how to invoke the command:
dnssec-signzone -r /dev/random -g -d /registry/tld-zone/child-keys/ \
-o tld -f tld.signed db.tld
An alternative method of including DS RRs into ones zone is by concatenating
to, or, including the ds-sets in the zone le.
cat /registry/tld-zone/child-dssets/dsset-* >> tld
dnssec-signzone -r /dev/random -o tld -f tld.signed db.tld
When the parent signs its own zone and uses the -d ag with dnssec-signzone
its own ds- and key-set will end up in the specied directory, that can be quite
confusing.
12 The person who is responsible for publishing the zone data
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4.3 Possible problems
Public Key Algorithm To be globally secure you need to use at least one key
of an algorithm that is mandatory to implement. Mandatory to implement
are RSA/SHA1 and DSA keys. We recommend the use of RSA/SHA1 keys
only.
Parent indicating child security It is important that a DNSKEY is pub-
lished in the DNS before the parent includes a signed DS RR for that
key.
If the parent includes a DS RR while the child has not yet published the
key then the child will go 'bad'; By not having a DS RR for the child, the
parent indicates the child to be insecure.
As a parent you should always validate that the child publishes a signed
DNSKEY before including a DS RR.
4.4 Registering with a DLV registry
If your parent is not yet secure you could consider gesturing with a DLV registry
so that 3rd parties can still make use of the security your domain provides (for
client side conguration see section 2.6)
BIND's dnssec-signzone contains an option to create a le that con-
tains the data relevant to the DLV registry. Suppose that your favourite
DLV registry is anchored under dlv-registry.org then signing with the -l
<dlv-registry-anchor> option will create a dlvset le.
For example:
/usr/local/sbin/dnssec-signzone \
-l dlv-registry.org \
-o example.net \
-k Kexample.net.+005+49656 \
db.example.net \
Kexample.net.+005+17000.key
will create a le called dlvset-example.net. that contains the following
information:
example.net.dlv-registry.org. IN DLV 49656 5 1 3850EFB913AEC66275BCA53221587D445702397E
This author suggests you use the ISC lookaside registration service. See
http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/dlv/
5 Rolling keys
A rollover is the process in which one key in a zone is replaced by another key.
Since keys have a limited lifetime they need to be changed occasionally. Care
needs to be taken that existing chains of trust are not broken during the rollover.
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The rollover is dened by the moment keys generated with the "new" private
key are rst introduced into the zone. The key pair may have been generated well
in advance and the public key may also have been made public well in advance.
If the rollover is planned we refer to it as scheduled rollover. If the rollover
is the result of a (suspected) compromise or loss of private key it is called an
unscheduled or emergency key rollover.
There are two types of scheduled key rollovers. The rollovers of key-signing
keys and the rollovers of zone-signing keys.
Although the DNSSEC protocol does not make a distinction between zone-
and key-signing keys we strongly advice you to make this distinction as it provides
a clear separation between the keys that can be rolled without external interaction
(the zone-signing keys) and the keys that need external interaction (the key-
signing keys). You should use the -f KSK ag with dnssec-keygen when creating
key-signing keys so that you can always make a distinction between key- and
zone-signing keys by looking at the so-called ag eld in the DNSKEY resource
record. Its ag-eld will be odd (257 mostly) when you deal with a key-signing,
or SEP, key.
5.1 DNS traversal
Whenever data in a zone le is replaced by other data, it will need to propagate
through the DNS before DNS clients actually see it. In a non-DNSSEC envi-
ronment this may hardly ever be noticed, but when operating DNSSEC allowing
data to traverse through the DNS is critical.
DNS data with its associated signatures and the public key with which this
data is validated travel through the DNS independently. This also implies that
the public keys and the signatures are independently cached and therefore expire
from caches at dierent times. As a consequence it can happen that an RRSIG
is validated with a DNSKEY from a cache and that the RRSIG and DNSKEY
come from dierent versions of the zone; i.e. the public key relates to a key that
is older than the signature. The reverse, where the signatures are older than the
public keys that are used for validation can also happen.
As a zone administrator you have to be aware of this behaviour and take into
account that your signatures will need to validate with any future or previous
version of your key-set. [10] describes the details which dier for zone-signing and
key-signing key rollovers. There are two approaches for this. The "pre-publish"
and the "double signature" rollover.
First let us take a closer look at how data traverses through the DNS. See
Figure 10 for reference.
At t0 new data replaces data from a previous version of the zone le. The
data is published on the authoritative master (or primary server). It will take
some time (which we refer to as zone synchronisation time) before the new version
of the zone is picked up by all authoritative servers. In the worst case scenario, a
change to a slave server will not be able to reach the master server and the zone
will expire. So the maximum value of the zone synchronisation time will be the
value of the SOA expiration parameter.
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Assume that at some time (t1) between publication of the new zone on the
master server(t0) and the time the new zone is picked up by a slave server (t2)
a query for the data is done by a recursive caching name server. That recursive
server will return the old data to any of its clients for the time that is set by the
TTL value on the old RRset. Only after t4, will the recursive server go back and
query for new data picking up the new records.
Note that the t4 does not only depend on t1+TTL but is also upper bound
by the signature expiration time of the signature on the old RRset.
Figure 10: DNS Data Propagation
5.2 "Pre-Publish" and "Double Signature" rollovers
During a pre-publish rollover the public key is introduced in the DNSKEY RRset
well before RRSIGs are made with the private part of the key. The "new" public
keys are then available in caches when the RRSIGs over the data show up on the
authoritative name servers and caching name servers can use cached DNSKEY
RRs to validate the new data.
During a double signature rollover the new key pair is introduced and sig-
natures are generated with both the new and the old key. Both public keys are
published in the DNS. After the period it takes for this data to propagate through
the DNS, the old key is removed and only the new key is published and used for
signing.
5.3 Tools
To properly maintain 'state' you will need an operational note book. For each
of your zone there will be multiple KSKs and ZSKs and these keys all have a
'state'. The situation may become very confusing. Below we give an overview
of the operations using an "operational note book" At the RIPE NCC a tool
has been developed that replaces the "operational note book" and that links to
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the signing operations. This tool is available through: http://www.ripe.net/
disi/dnssec_maint_tool/.
Sparta has developed a daemon and a control tool, rollerd and rollctl
respectively. Rollerd automates key rollovers. That is, it automates the steps
necessary to change over from one Zone Signing Key (ZSK) to the next using
the Pre-Publish Method of key rollover. It can also automate the less frequent
Key Signing Key (KSK) change over using the Double Signature Method of key
rollover. See RFC 4641[10] for a descriptions of these key rollover methods.
OpenDNSSEC (www.opendnssec.org) is an initiative to develop a compre-
hensive system for key-maintenance and signing tool that can maintain signed
zone on the basis of pre-dened zone signing and key-maintenance policies. The
rst prototypes are, at the moment this document is written, expected mid 2009.
5.4 ZSK rollover
During a Zone-signing key (ZSK) rollover we use a "pre-publish" scheme.
5.4.1 ZSK preparation (production phase)
Use the trivial example.com zone (Figure 11) as an example. The zone is stored
in db.example.com.
Assuming that we rst start to publish example.com we generate two ZSK
keys and one KSK key.
dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.com
Kexample.com.+005+63935
dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.com
Kexample.com.+005+64700
dnssec-keygen -f KSK -a RSASHA1 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.com
Kexample.com.+005+54915
In the operational note book we note that key 63935 will be used as the active
and key 64700 as the passive ZSK. Both keys will be available through the key-set
but only the active key is used for signing.
After we generated the keys we include them in the zone by adding the
following include statements to db.example.com
;; ZSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+63935.key
$include Kexample.com.+005+64700.key
;; KSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+54915.key
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; example.net zone
;
$TTL 100
$ORIGIN example.net.
@ 100 IN SOA ns.example.net. (
olaf.nlnetlabs.nl.
2002050501
100
200
604800
100
)
NS ns.example.net.
ns.example.net. A 192.168.2.203
a A 192.168.2.1
b A 192.168.2.2
* A 192.168.2.10
b.a A 192.168.2.11
Figure 11: Trivial example.com
Then sign the zone. Since we do not want to use dnssec-signzone's default
behaviour, (which is to use all available keys for signing), we have to fully specify
which keys to use on the command line. Since you will have to do this frequently
the operational note book will come in handy.
dnssec-signzone -k Kexample.com.+005+54915.key -o example.com \
db.example.com Kexample.com.+005+63935
Note that we supplied the KSK as an argument with the -k switch and only
the active key ZSK as a signing key.
5.4.2 ZSK rollover (phase1)
Note down the signature expiration of the DNSKEY RR as it is now available
in the DNS. This value can be used as an upper limit for the duration of this
phase. It is the value of t4 in Figure 10. In the DNSKEY RR set below the
signature expiration time is August 21, 2004 around 11:35 UTC. If all 13 the
13 including the last parameter in the SOA that is used for negative caching
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TTLs in your zone are not higher than for example 600, you would not have to
wait that long. You would have to wait until you see the new zone published in
all authoritative servers and an additional 10 minutes. The signature expiration
is an upper bound.
100 DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
AQPQyhg865V4zkFZN+FICLAZPWWaAf5I43pW
UcuOiejT92AVu0eHOkbH5YiHV97r+QjAdZ7K
W7W+bvbqKBR5P4QMVNm8zCs5Trb9OcOY0+bb
LYZG3aG69wUfF1pjvmFV5zUSRHCLMEzXb5NS
XdazgdhhuM07L2e2EfJGp5qijtRwpQ==
) ; key id = 63935
100 DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
AQPWrMsW0sGSTD7iE9ou+s7886WeSLIq/l/J
CgqwAn7jlECGAAN6cSHV5jWvovcWFthapWdG
DpC1uL48AcWtVWkRABGjU8Q16CAy0EcZ+24V
4cul+VluBt1YjuNfUlye+k5V+lmkjXBQ3Qdf
E8/owjsdx9mTkeQC4qiFjUxWXTl4DQ==
) ; key id = 64700
100 DNSKEY 257 3 5 (
AQPhZQ29Xg60NLgR+qdJENZpklU+WQF0abmp
Ni3CeOYyR+bd01Q/2WDI6BbWCLdIb9YflRaj
hmyb+AmzmjNzhw8VjcY9Sr2zIcG50ctuZ8Og
t7fcGrCbEM9fIDIKdDRlf+SY8OnGEMi6sI4m
bZ4zoh+nWfNrTxQR5hHv074uSAvZyQ==
) ; key id = 54915
100 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 100 20040821114554 (
20040722114554 54915 example.com.
gcnf3rf+D6izv9A//16u+Jx/LDVinLtcpkWR
yxDV5goS2SnoLfyEryqbSAyKbh4redyQCjSW
/HZXFBoPYrAy8fqaY1AfjVP+q9zJPvysUOp+
2T6mm8/9pcZoGXw1wPjPUAz+AF0oJnoaWo7t
764xvZc47kAI1pT0RTizV2BofcU= )
100 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 100 20040821114554 (
20040722114554 63935 example.com.
T7gRcEZkxEl5iGJdCzSu47Og9ydMO5Uggvcz
A9jETiTUrBttyYua7qDZOjNrzT4GVZ6s/UBw
tbGCqyMU/sVvaulP4h8oerX44bw5eP/mluLY
T9rwm2jBI1rZSPDdGDp8lJ2vvrxASYSF2Fxg
At the moment of the rollover you have to make your current passive key
(64700) active and your current active key (63935) passive. Also make a note
that this key is to be removed from the keyset in the next phase of the rollover.
Increase the SOA serial number and re-sign the zone using the new active key.
dnssec-signzone -k Kexample.com.+005+54915.key -o \
example.com db.example.com \
Kexample.com.+005+64700
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Publish this zone in the DNS and make sure it remains published long enough
to propagate through the DNS.
5.4.3 ZSK Cleanup (phase2)
After the data has propagated though the DNS, you have to replace the passive
ZSK (63935) by a new passive key.
Start with generating the passive ZSK.
dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.com
Kexample.com.+005+01844
Add the new passive key (01844) into the zone le. Remove the old passive
key (63935) from the zone le.
;; ZSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+64700.key
$include Kexample.com.+005+01844.key
;; KSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+54915.key
Increase the SOA serial and re-sign using the same active key as in phase1.
dnssec-signzone -k Kexample.com.+005+54915.key -o example.com db.example.com \
Kexample.com.+005+64700
After publishing your zone you are back in the "production" phase. You
should not proceed in a new rollover until the current DNSKEY RRset has had
a chance to propagate through the system
You can now delete the 63935 key. We suggest you move the key pair to a
separate directory or make a backup.
5.4.4 Modifying zone data during a rollover
You can at any time modify zone data other than the data in the key-set. As
long as you use the suitable active ZSK for signing.
5.5 Key-signing key rollovers
During a key-signing key (KSK) rollover we use a "double signature" scheme.
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5.5.1 KSK preparation (production phase)
We again use the trivial example.com zone (Figure 11) as an example. The zone
is stored in db.example.com. It contains a active and a passive ZSK (63935 and
64700 respectively) and a KSK (54915). The include statements are the same as
Section 5.4.1:
;; ZSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+63935.key
$include Kexample.com.+005+64700.key
;; KSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+54915.key
and the command to sign the zone is also the same.
dnssec-signzone -k Kexample.com.+005+54915.key -o example.com \
db.example.com Kexample.com.+005+63935
5.5.2 ZSK rollover (phase 1)
We start the rollover by generating a new KSK
dnssec-keygen -f KSK -a RSASHA1 -b 1024 -n ZONE example.com
Kexample.com.+005+06456
Insert the new KSK into the zone le:
;; ZSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+63935.key
$include Kexample.com.+005+64700.key
;; KSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+54915.key
$include Kexample.com.+005+06456.key
Sign the zone with both KSKs and the active ZSK.
dnssec-signzone -k Kexample.com.+005+54915.key \
-k Kexample.com.+005+06456.key -o example.com \
db.example.com \ Kexample.com.+005+64700
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You have now introduced the new KSK key.
Since you are rolling a KSK you will have to upload this key to your parent
or have to congure it into your trust anchors (see Section 2.3). The public key
you will have to upload and congure is the new one with key-id 06456.
If your parent has a DS RR pointing to your old key, it will take time before
that DS RR has expired from caches. The upper limit on the t4 parameter is the
signature expiration time in the DS RR pointing to the old KSK (54915).
dnssec-signzone provides two les that will help you during this process.
dsset-example.com. and keyset-example.com.. The "dsset" le contains the
DS RRs that relate to the KSKs in your zone le and the "keyset" le contains
the KSKs published in your zone le. Remember that since you are replacing
keys only one of these entries (06456) will need to be sent/appear at your parent.
5.5.3 KSK cleanup (phase 2)
Once you are satised that all trust anchors are updated and the parental DS
RR has travelled through the DNS you can remove the old key from the set of
includes:
;; ZSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+63935.key
$include Kexample.com.+005+64700.key
;; KSKs
$include Kexample.com.+005+06456.key
Sign the zone with the new KSK and the active ZSK.
dnssec-signzone -k Kexample.com.+005+06456.key \
-o example.com db.example.com \
Kexample.com.+005+64700
From this moment on you are in the production phase again.
5.5.4 Multiple KSKs
This algorithm also applies if you have multiple KSKs.The steps are:
 generate and include the new KSK in the zone;
 sign the zone with all KSKs; wait for propagation;
 remove one of the KSKs and sign with all left over KSKs.
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Part III
Troubleshooting tools
This part describes a few practical trouble shooting tools that may
help to understand what goes wrong, if something goes wrong.
6 Using drill for troubleshooting
Both dig, from the BIND distribution, as drill can be used for trouble shooting
DNSSEC set ups. See section 7 for more information about dig, we will rst
discuss drill.
drill is part of the ldns library available from http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
ldns/. Installation instructions are also available on that page. (It is as simple
as: ./configure ; make ; make install).
Drill's -T and -S switches are particularly helpful when troubleshooting
DNSSEC setups. Using drill with the -T follows the chain of trust from the
root to the leaves and indicates the security status (see gure 13). With the -S
ag drill will chase the signatures from the leave-node back to the root, looking
for the relevant records (see gure 14). When using the -T or -S ag you will
have to specify a le that contains a trust-anchor in RR format i.e. just as in
the les generated by dnssec-keygen (see page 22).
The ldns library does not only come with drill. You will nd a few useful
utilities in its examples directory. Among others there are:
ldns-key2ds Creates a DS record from a DNSKEY record
ldns-keyfecther Fetches DNSSEC public keys for zones
ldns-keygen Generate private/pubkey key pair for DNSSEC.
ldns-signzone Signs a zone le according to DNSSECbis.
ldns-walk 'Walks' a DNSSEC zone
7 Using dig for troubleshooting
dig has a few switches that come in useful when troubleshooting DNSSEC setups.
+multiline Structures the output of dig so that it is easily readable. As a
bonus the keyid will be printed as a comment behind DNSKEY RRs.
+cd Sets the "checking disabled" bit on the query. You would typically use this
when your validating recursive name server reports a SERVFAIL and you
need to establish if the is due to DNSSEC marking this data as "bad".
+dnssec Forces the server being queried to include the DNSSEC related data.
Use in combination with the +cd to establish if data from a zone is signed
at all or if you want to determine if the validity intervals on the signatures
are correct.
+trace Traces delegation chain. This option may be helpful if you trying to
gure out where the delegation points are.
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+sigchase Traces the the signature chain. You will also need to have a
./trusted-keys.keys or /etc/trusted-keys.keys available that con-
tains trusted key entries.
8 DNSSEC tools
A number of open-source DNSSEC tools can be found at www.dnssec-tools.
org. The site contains a number of generic maintenance tools for zone and key
administration, some DNSSEC applications (mozilla and spam assassin plug-ins),
and a few troubleshooting tools.
One of these tools has is dnspktflow tool that visualizes DNS 'streams' in
a graph. This tool may help, in combination with the tools above, to create a
bit of insight of what is going on. For instance, in gure 15 the packets that are
send and received during the trace in gure 14 are shown.
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bin/drill version 1.5.1 (ldns version 1.5.1)
Written by NLnet Labs.
Copyright (c) 2004-2008 NLnet Labs.
Licensed under the revised BSD license.
There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Usage: bin/drill name [@server] [type] [class]
<name> can be a domain name or an IP address (-x lookups)
<type> defaults to A
<class> defaults to IN
arguments may be placed in random order
Options:
-D enable DNSSEC (DO bit)
-T trace from the root down to <name>
-S chase signature(s) from <name> to a know key [*]
-V <number> verbosity (0-5)
-Q quiet mode (overrules -V)
-f file read packet from file and send it
-i file read packet from file and print it
-w file write answer packet to file
-q file write query packet to file
-h show this help
-v show version
Query options:
-4 stay on ip4
-6 stay on ip6
-a fallback to EDNS0 and TCP if the answer is truncated
-b <bufsize> use <bufsize> as the buffer size (defaults to 512 b)
-c <file> use file for rescursive nameserver configuration (/etc/resolv.conf)
-k <file> specify a file that contains a trusted DNSSEC key [**]
used to verify any signatures in the current answer
-o <mnemonic> set flags to: [QR|qr][AA|aa][TC|tc][RD|rd][CD|cd][RA|ra][AD|ad]
lowercase: unset bit, uppercase: set bit
-p <port> use <port> as remote port number
-s show the DS RR for each key in a packet
-u send the query with udp (the default)
-x do a reverse lookup
when doing a secure trace:
-r <file> use file as root servers hint file
-t send the query with tcp (connected)
-d <domain> use domain as the start point for the trace
-y <name:key[:algo]> specify named base64 tsig key, and optional an
algorithm (defaults to hmac-md5.sig-alg.reg.int)
-z don't randomize the nameservers before use
[*] = enables/implies DNSSEC
[**] = can be given more than once
ldns-team@nlnetlabs.nl | http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ldns/
Figure 12: drill arguments
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;; Domain: .
[T] . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Checking if signing key is trusted:
New key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQyahTOOaR/Pi6p+EG+JldP9wQJurw7iB8Mz+De45akisO/VeprAd0s77lA5Nxz+42XP+VcGMqSIhUVlx1WIXDl4ZHBG8mKocfNt0mnOJhgn74kMr/wZIkHwHaAh0ibuXavE7L8S0YDY7Jn+S0ecoDSgWE0MHuvXvFY3EMiBmsMQ== ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Trusted key: . 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+1IrU3q2SrG+36bmJfFs1+u7XaMgytcTftdBoYBquXqYVmYt4EtI9soyZBG6jS5CtkrzWnk721/ZFgGyatkrSq80WQ4047jw8aMAMbyM5kEUvuMJqn7vqieUDW/XKBcgoIqx+spyq75bg3EVzrAeJ4qO8Hrd+3pZuT3G7wSZy3bOk8NNxPZ7dWoH8tjCjXlmPcAxkJoewi1iY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQyahTOOaR/Pi6p+EG+JldP9wQJurw7iB8Mz+De45akisO/VeprAd0s77lA5Nxz+42XP+VcGMqSIhUVlx1WIXDl4ZHBG8mKocfNt0mnOJhgn74kMr/wZIkHwHaAh0ibuXavE7L8S0YDY7Jn+S0ecoDSgWE0MHuvXvFY3EMiBmsMQ== ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Key is now trusted!
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+1IrU3q2SrG+36bmJfFs1+u7XaMgytcTftdBoYBquXqYVmYt4EtI9soyZBG6jS5CtkrzWnk721/ZFgGyatkrSq80WQ4047jw8aMAMbyM5kEUvuMJqn7vqieUDW/XKBcgoIqx+spyq75bg3EVzrAeJ4qO8Hrd+3pZuT3G7wSZy3bOk8NNxPZ7dWoH8tjCjXlmPcAxkJoewi1iY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
[T] net. 100 IN DS 13467 5 1 de01426e08ddb9186502ccc1081390cd7da0e178
net. 100 IN DS 13467 5 2 ec9b094786b82c46aa3054c7352b59904b697119d515b4ea536ec3dd9a10ed81
;; Domain: net.
[T] net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ;{id = 62972 (zsk), size = 1024b}
net. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 ;{id = 13467 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Checking if signing key is trusted:
New key: net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPVP6Jea1Lo/dU19UCmumJqR36Mx6ecjXxdwTByhyn//3S/NgDTgYbTzvFq+dmjcH1ccuCIWS9PPB9tmQ5grQ2YMwee2VLTrrtRnOPX2gm8e86g8m5KRnTX20FQPla8TLGJmdCwMq4yFIwyCUFiZ1CsZKl6JJ+Y0h9RuwZ8h3J3Gw== ;{id = 62972 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Trusted key: . 3600 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+1IrU3q2SrG+36bmJfFs1+u7XaMgytcTftdBoYBquXqYVmYt4EtI9soyZBG6jS5CtkrzWnk721/ZFgGyatkrSq80WQ4047jw8aMAMbyM5kEUvuMJqn7vqieUDW/XKBcgoIqx+spyq75bg3EVzrAeJ4qO8Hrd+3pZuT3G7wSZy3bOk8NNxPZ7dWoH8tjCjXlmPcAxkJoewi1iY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPQyahTOOaR/Pi6p+EG+JldP9wQJurw7iB8Mz+De45akisO/VeprAd0s77lA5Nxz+42XP+VcGMqSIhUVlx1WIXDl4ZHBG8mKocfNt0mnOJhgn74kMr/wZIkHwHaAh0ibuXavE7L8S0YDY7Jn+S0ecoDSgWE0MHuvXvFY3EMiBmsMQ== ;{id = 63380 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Trusted key: . 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOv6tbkmW+1IrU3q2SrG+36bmJfFs1+u7XaMgytcTftdBoYBquXqYVmYt4EtI9soyZBG6jS5CtkrzWnk721/ZFgGyatkrSq80WQ4047jw8aMAMbyM5kEUvuMJqn7vqieUDW/XKBcgoIqx+spyq75bg3EVzrAeJ4qO8Hrd+3pZuT3G7wSZy3bOk8NNxPZ7dWoH8tjCjXlmPcAxkJoewi1iY/ ;{id = 63276 (ksk), size = 1280b}
Trusted key: net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AQPVP6Jea1Lo/dU19UCmumJqR36Mx6ecjXxdwTByhyn//3S/NgDTgYbTzvFq+dmjcH1ccuCIWS9PPB9tmQ5grQ2YMwee2VLTrrtRnOPX2gm8e86g8m5KRnTX20FQPla8TLGJmdCwMq4yFIwyCUFiZ1CsZKl6JJ+Y0h9RuwZ8h3J3Gw== ;{id = 62972 (zsk), size = 1024b}
Key is now trusted!
Trusted key: net. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQOsAH77fsZc53KoA9QfrXABEoXa5ZIBmUmJuXvnp36/LEgfn4ItTnOGMKHesgIV/qopgs+4dZxSIrAjGF92y3Mp3+79YxdAF0aomnDI3Bt0r/s5SnXzN7Uzj1mduZDTnPJzXQPto4+On+TRrysK+MWVOzPmcI7bNyM/+d1MpVsLzTCeNAWVDtUjtleYaxJjrOO2B2HvMWip3GTesykbAQuH ;{id = 13467 (ksk), size = 1280b}
[T] example.net. 100 IN DS 49656 5 2 9e06b299abe811d699e077fff990ff5a1b496c914deb22697ba22a1da31f0a6e
example.net. 100 IN DS 49656 5 1 3850efb913aec66275bca53221587d445702397e
;; Domain: example.net.
[T] example.net. 100 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ;{id = 17000 (zsk), size = 1024b}
example.net. 100 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 ;{id = 49656 (ksk), size = 1280b}
[T] example.net. 100 IN SOA ns.example.net. olaf.nlnetlabs.nl. 2002050501 100 200 604800 100
;;[S] self sig OK; [B] bogus; [T] trusted
Figure 13: Output of drill -T -k < root:ksk > example.net SOA
;; Chasing: example.net. SOA
DNSSEC Trust tree:
example.net. (SOA)
|---example.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 17000)
|---example.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 49656)
|---example.net. (DS keytag: 49656)
|---net. (DNSKEY keytag: 62972)
|---net. (DNSKEY keytag: 13467)
|---net. (DS keytag: 13467)
|---. (DNSKEY keytag: 63380)
|---. (DNSKEY keytag: 63276)
;; Chase successful
Figure 14: Output of drill -S -k < root:ksk > example.net SOA
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Figure 15: Example of dnspktflow output
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Part IV
Securing communication between
Servers
This part considers transaction security issues, which are typically not
considered to be part of DNSSEC and can be deployed completely in-
dependently. This part focuses on securing the transactions between
authoritative servers, but the same techniques can be used to secure
dynamic updates.
9 Securing zone transfers
9.1 Introduction
The communication between hosts can be secured (authenticated and encrypted)
using a scheme based on symmetric cryptography. By sharing a key the adminis-
trators of two servers can be sure that DNS data is only being exchanged between
those two boxes and that the data has not been tampered with in transit.
The most known mechanism used to enable this is referred to as TSIG[17]
and is based on a shared secret. The shared secret is used to sign the content
of each DNS packet. The signature can be used for both authentication and
for integrity checking of the data. In order to prevent a malicious third party
retransmitting captured data (replay attack) a time stamp is included in the data.
The TSIG mechanism can also be used to prevent unauthorised zone transfers;
only owners of the secret key are able to do a zone transfer 14. We will describe
how primary server ns.foo.example and secondary server ns.example.com need
to be congured to enable TSIG for zone transfers.
To congure TSIG perform the following steps:
 Synchronise clocks.
 Create and distribute a shared secret, the TSIG key.
 At the primary server, create an access list specifying which keys are allowed
to transfer.
 At the secondary server, specify which keys to use when contacting which
primary servers
The rst item is a prerequisite for DNSSEC. If you do DNSSEC you should
be in sync with the rest of the world: Use NTP. Time zones can be confusing.
Use date -u to validate if your machine has the proper UTC time.
TSIG conguration is a task for system administrators.
14 The data in the DNS is public data; disabling zone transfers does not guarantee your DNS
data will become 'invisible'
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9.2 Generating a TSIG key
There are various ways to create a shared secret.
9.2.1 Generating a TSIG secret with dnssec-keygen
dnssec-keygen is the tool used to generate a base64 encoded random num-
ber that will be used as the secret. The arguments that we have to provide
dnssec-keygen to generate a TSIG key are (also see Figure 6):
dnssec-keygen -a hmac-md5 -b 256 -n HOST ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.
The command produces two les 15. The name of the les contain relevant
information:
Kdomain name+algorithm id+key id.extension
The domain name is the name specied as the name of the key. The name
specied here does not need to be a name that you can query in the DNS but
should be a name can be encoded as a domain name. The convention is to
concatenate the DNS names of the two servers.
One can use dnssec-keygen to generate a truly random secret or use a
passphrase - we describe both methods in Section 9.2. In this particular case
ns.foo.example. and ns.example.com. The algorithm id identies the al-
gorithm used: 5 for HMAC-MD5 (1 and 3 are for RSA and DSA respectively, see
Appendix A.1. in [5]). The key id is an identier for the key material, it is not
of relevance for symmetric keys. The extension is either key or private, the
rst is the public key and the second is the private key.
The format of these les diers a bit but they contain exactly the same
information; a base64 encoded random number that you are going to use as a
shared secret. Do not be misled by the extensions private and key, both les
should be kept secure. Since the secret material is copied to the conguration les
and these les are not used in production you should actually consider deleting
them.
Note that the -n HOST and the name are not used for the generation of the
base64 encoded random number. It is a convention to use the unique domain
name label used to identify the key as the name.
# dnssec-keygen -r /dev/random -a HMAC-MD5 -b 128 -n HOST \
ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.
Kns.foo.example.ns.example.com.+157+12274
# cat Kns.foo.example.ns.example.com.+157+12274.key
ns.foo.example.ns.example.com. IN DNSKEY 512 3 157 gQOqMJA/LGHwJa8vtD7u6w==
# cat Kns.foo.example.ns.example.com.+157+12274.private
Private-key-format: v1.2
Algorithm: 157 (HMAC_MD5)
15 It is a feature of the dnssec-keygen program to always creates two les, even when it is
generating symmetric keys.
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Key: gQOqMJA/LGHwJa8vtD7u6w==
The base64 encoded random number is is the thing you need to extract from
either of these les (i.e. gQOqMJA/LGHwJa8vtD7u6w==) it species the secret in
the key statement:
key ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.{
algorithm hmac-md5;
secret "gQOqMJA/LGHwJa8vtD7u6w==";
};
This key denition should be included in both primary and secondary name
server conguration les and should be exactly the same on both sides (in this
example ns.foo.example.ns.example.com. is used on both name servers). It
is recommended to generate a secret for each dierent party, with which you are
involved and you will need to maintain as many secrets as zones for which you
have secondaries.
9.2.2 Other ways to generate secrets
The dnssec-keygen command provides you with a truly random bit sequence.
It might be dicult to communicate the secret to your colleague running a sec-
ondary server on the other side of the world. In those cases you may want to
choose to fall back to a pass-phrase that can be communicated over the telephone.
You can use any base64 encoder to convert the pass-phrase to a valid string
in the key-denition.
# echo "Crypto Rules" | mmencode
Q3J5cHRvIFJ1bGVzCg==
If mmencode is not available maybe this perl script can assist you.
#!/usr/bin/perl
use MIME::Base64;
print encode_base64("@ARGV") ;
Actually any string that can be base64 decoded will do, for example
ThisIsAValidBase64String can also be used as secret.
9.3 Conguring TSIG keys
To secure a zone transfer, the primary server and the secondary server admin-
istrators have to congure a TSIG key in named.conf. The TSIG key consists
of a secret and a hashing algorithm and are identied by domain names. We
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recommend that you maintain the list of secret keys in a separate le which is
readable by root only and included in the named.conf le (e.g. by include
/var/named/shared.keys).
The key statement looks like:
key ns.foo.example.ns.example.com. {
algorithm hmac-md5
secret "gQOqMJA/LGHwJa8vtD7u6w==";
};
This statement needs to be exactly the same for the two parties involved.
9.4 Primary servers conguration of TSIG
Both the primary and secondary server should have shared secret congured by
using the key statement in a le included in named.conf (see above).
The primary server can now use the key in what BIND calls an
[3] address match list. These lists appear in the allow-notify, allow-query,
allow-transfer and allow-recursion statements which controls access to the
server. (Also see section 6.1.1 and 6.2.14.3 of the on-line BIND documentation).
Relevant at this point is the allow-transfer in the zone statement. Using
the key generated above, the primary server for foo.example would have the
following statement in named.conf:
zone "foo.example" {
type master;
file db.foo.example.signed;
\\ allow transfer only from secondary server that has
\\ key ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.
allow-transfer { key ns.foo.example.ns.example.com. ; };
notify yes;
};
9.5 Secondary servers conguration of TSIG
Both the primary and secondary server should have shared secret congured by
using the key statement in named.conf (see above).
The server denition in named.conf is used to instruct the name server to
use a specic key when contacting another name server.
\\ secondary for foo.example.
\\ primary server ns.foo.example is on 10.1.1.2
server 10.1.1.2 {
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keys { ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.;};
};
9.6 Securing the NOTIFY message too
The setup above will provide signatures for the zone transfer from the primary
to the secondary. Since the session is initiated by the secondary server 16 it is the
secondary server that sets up the secure link. Therefore, the secondary server
has the server denition in its named.conf. Alternatively you can secure the
trac to the secondary server that was initiated by the primary server. Think
of the NOTIFY messages send to the secondary server when the zone content
changed. That trac will be TSIG signed as soon as you add a server with the
secondary's IP address in the primary's named.conf. You can use the same key
as for the zone transfer.
Once the primary server has congured its server to use TSIG to sign the
NOTIFY messages the secondary server can use the key in the allow-notify
access control list.
9.7 Troubleshooting TSIG conguration
You can check the format of your named.conf using the named-checkconf pro-
gram. This program reads the conguration le using the same routines as named
itself.
To troubleshoot your conguration, you have the log le and dig at your
disposal.
Before adding the allow-transfer fkey ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.
;g; you should be able to transfer the domain from any machine. dig
@ns.foo.example foo.example AXFR should be successful. After key cong-
uration the same command should fail and give you output similar to:
; <<>> DiG 9.2.0rc1 <<>> @ns.foo.example foo.example AXFR
;; global options printcmd
; Transfer failed.
You can test if the key is congured correctly in two ways.
Method 1 Ask the zone administrator to increase the SOA serial and to have
the zone reloaded on the primary server. The secondary server should pick up
the changes.
The log le of the secondary server will have entries similar to:
... general: info: zone foo.example/IN: transfered serial 2001082801
... xfer-in: info: transfer of 'foo.example/IN' from 10.1.1.2\#53: end of transfer
16 Remember the zone transfer is over TCP
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Method 2 Use dig to test the key by using the -k ag.
dig @ns.foo.example -k Kns.foo.example.ns.example.com.+157+12274.key \
foo.example AXFR
Alternatively you can use the -y switch and specify the key-name and the
secret 17 with the -y switch.
dig @ns.foo.example \
-y ns.foo.example.ns.example.com.:gQOqMJA/LGHwJa8vtD7u6w== \
foo.example AXFR
If the key did not match the log le of the primary server against which you tried
this, will have entries similar to the following.
... security: error: client 10.1.1.6#1379: zone transfer 'foo.example.com/IN' denied
9.8 Possible problems
9.8.1 Timing problems
Machines that are involved in a TSIG signed transaction need to have their
clocks synchronised to within a few 18 minutes. Use 'NTP' to synchronise the
machines and make sure the time zones are correctly congured. A wrong time-
zone conguration can lead to hard to spot problems; use date -u to check what
your machine thinks is the 'UTC' time.
9.8.2 Multiple server directives
TSIG is a mechanism to protect communication on a per machine basis. Hav-
ing multiple server directives for the same server or multiple keys in one server
directive will lead to unexpected results.
17 Take care when using secrets on the command line of multi-user systems: on most Unix
systems command line arguments are visible on the output of ps or via the /proc le system
18 BIND has 5 minutes hard coded
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Part V
Appendices
A Deploying DNSSEC: the Milestones
In order to deploy DNSSEC in existing infrastructure a number of steps will need
to be made. Try taking the following milestones, and their interdependencies into
account when developing a project plan.
A.1 Private Key policies and procedures
prerequisites none
description The policies and procedures concerning the private key handling
are a prerequisite for designing your architecture. There are a number of issues
that need thought, documentation and management signo.
 The use of key signing and zone signing keys (KSK and ZSKs)
 Generation mechanism for keys
{ Who generates the keys
{ Where are the keys generated e.g. is there special hardware involved
{ How are the keys stored after generation
{ Technical consideration: what is the source of randomness.
{ What key lengths are used
 Who has access to the keys, is this dierent for KSKs and ZSKs
 Where and how are the keys stored in the production environment
 How long will the keys be used
Some of these decisions may inuence the complexity of your operation. In
practice the considerations will need to be based on a risk analysis i.e. what will
happen if the key would be compromised.
A.2 Public Key policies and procedures
prerequisites
description The policies concerning the public key could be published publicly
so that all users that use your key as a trust-anchor know what they are up to.
These policies are closely related to your private key policy and should doc-
ument
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 If and how a distinction can be made between zone signing keys (ZSKs)
and key signing keys (KSK).
 Signing frequencies of KSK and ZSKs.
 Rollover frequencies of KSK and ZSKs.
 Rollover techniques used (Further considerations see [10] and [15] ).
 How the keys are published and which o-band mechanism(s) for validation
are oered.
 How changes to the policy are announced in a way such these announce-
ments can be validated.
 How will emergencies be communicate and how can people validate such
messages.
In appendix E we have reproduced an example public key policy statement
inspired on the one in use by the RIPE NCC.
A.3 Signing infrastructure
prerequisites A.2
description The signing infrastructure is all the infrastructure needed to turn
unsigned records into signed records. The architecture of this setup depends on
how your provisioning system generates data for the DNS and how the data is
put into the DNS. If you use proprietary systems without zone-les you may not
be able to depend on standard tools.
The design also depends on how access to the private keys (ZSK and KSKs)
is arranged.
A.4 Server infrastructure
prerequisites External, software needs to support same features.
description All the servers, primary and secondary zones, need to be able to
support the DNSSEC protocol. If one of the servers does not support DNSSEC
there will be failures. If you choose to deploy NSEC3 all the servers will need to
support NSEC3
There could be concerns with respect to growth of the size of the zoneles
as kept in memory or to increased trac or CPU loads. In practice the memory
concerns may be the most problematic. But the increase in memory can be
predicted, see C, [12], or [13].
For well provisioned server infrastructure the increase in CPU or network
trac should not be a problem.
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A.5 Monitoring tools
prerequisites A.2
description Tools are essential to make sure that what is served is correct, that
signatures will not expire and that your service levels are maintained.
When adding DNSSEC you will have to adapt or create monitoring tools,
also see ??.
A.6 Serving a Secured zone
prerequisites A.4 A.5 A.2 A.2
description At this moment you are ready to load the rst signed zone into
your nameservers. It is also the moment you can publish your trust anchors.
A.7 Requesting secure delegation
prerequisites A.6
description Once your zone is served you can request a secure delegation with
your parent, or in absence of a signed parent approach ISC for an entry in their
DLV registry.
A.8 Secure Delegation Provisioning
prerequisites A.6
description For the provisioning of secure delegations you will have to perform
two subtasks.
You will have to provide a method for the zone-owners to securely enter the
key signing key into your provisioning system. It is good to realize that the
method you use for exchanging NS RRs has the same security requirements as
the method for exchanging the DS information.
The details of the system depend a lot on how your registry, and possibly
registrars, are set up. For registry-registrar interaction it may be good to note
that EPP[6] supports DNSSEC.
You are advised to device a method to prevent your children to enter secure
entry-points for which there are no keys in the DNS i.e. you should try to prevent
security lameness.
The second subtask is that the DS RRs should be pulled from your provision-
ing system into the nameservers. The details of this process are also dependent
on your organization, but the process used for NS records can probably be cloned.
58B BIND INSTALLATION
B BIND installation
There are two open-source reference implementations of DNSSEC for authorita-
tive servers known to the author: BIND and NSD (http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
nsd). BIND is currently the only open-source recursive name server known to do
DNSSEC validation.
DNSSEC is available as of BIND 9.3.0. The latest versions of BIND can
be found on ISC's ftp server. DNSSEC support is only compiled if the openssl
library is congured during compilation.
Make sure you fetch the latest version of BIND (take care of the patch level
of the release indicated by -Pnumber) and verify the checksum.
configure with the --with-openssl ag.
If you want to have the "sigchase" capability (see Section 7) compiled into
dig you will have to set the STF CDEFINES variable to the -DDIG SIGCHASE=1
Check the output of cong to conrm that openssl was found. For example:
cd /usr/local/src
tar -xzf bind-9.4.1-P1.tar.gz
openssl sha1 bind-9.4.1-P1.tar.gz
...
cd bind-9.4.1-P1
./configure --prefix=/usr/local --with-openssl=/sw/
...
Checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... yes
checking for OpenSSL library... using openssl from /sw//lib and /sw//include
checking whether linking with OpenSSL works... yes
...
Please note that BIND 9.4.1 does not have DNSSEC enabled by default.
Therefore you have to use the dnssec-enable and the dnssec-validation di-
rectives in the options section of named.conf.
options {
// turn on dnssec awareness
dnssec-enable yes;
dnssec-validation yes;
};
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C Estimating zone size increase
When planning to sign zones you have have to consider that zone-signing will
increase your zone le size and the amount of memory used in the authoritative
name servers. We have performed some measurements where we took a number
of zone les, signed them and loaded them on a name server.
We started with the 1.8 thousand zones that the RIPE NCC serves on their
authoritative servers. For a number of these zones the RIPE NCC is the primary
server but for the largest part these are zones for which the RIPE NCC is sec-
ondary. The zones can roughly be split into two classes; "end-node" zones and
"delegation" zones. In end-node-zones, the data for most names in the zone is
authoritative (containing e.g. A, AAAA or PTR for most names). Delegation zones
contain mostly delegations (NS) records, typically these are Top-Level Domains
and "/16 reverse delegation" domains.
We signed the zone les with a 1024 bit RSASHA1 zone-signing key. During
the signing NSEC RRs with corresponding RRSIGs are added and all RRsets in
the zone are signed. Since a delegation NS RR is not an authoritative piece of
data, no signature is created.
Typically for an "end-node" zone one NSEC and two RRSIGs are introduced
into the zone, while for a delegation-type zone only one of each type of security
record is introduced. In Figure 16 we plotted the zone le size increase as a
function of the number of NSEC records. The number of NSEC records correlates
with the number of domain names in a zone. In the gure you can clearly see
a bi-modal distribution. One for the "end-node" type of zones and one for the
delegation type of zone.
We tted two linear relations to this data and found that for a delegation type
of zone the size increase is 350 bytes per owner name while for an "end-node"
zone the increase is 672 bytes per owner name.
In Figure 17, we plotted the relation between increase in core size versus
the zone le size increase due to signing. The relation is linear and the slope is
roughly 0.73. The core size increase is roughly 200 and 500 bytes for delegation
type and end-node type zones respectively.
You can use these parameters for approximate size calculations. Results may
vary depending on the size and the algorithm of the key you use, the version of
BIND 19 and the content of the zone.
D Generating random numbers
The generation of keys and, for the DSA algorithm, the generation of signatures
requires random numbers. You should take care that the random number gen-
erator produces "genuine" random numbers. The quality of random numbers
generated in software is debatable. This also applies to /dev/random devices.
These extract "randomness" from hardware response times. You should ensure
that your operating system produces a ow of good random numbers. For a
19 These measurements were done with a snapshot version of BIND 9.3
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Figure 16: Zone size vs number of owner names
machine that does not have any external sources of "randomness", this may be
tricky to achieve and cause your key generator or signer to block and wait for
entropy ("randomness").
One relatively simple tool to test "randomness" of data streams is ent from
Fourmilab <http://www.fourmilab.ch/random/>. Alternatively you could use
tools from NIST <http://csrc.nist.gov/rng/>. "Good" measurement result
from ent or the NIST tools should not be taken as a proof that your random
number generator is perfect. There could be systematic eects that are hard to
nd using this particular tool 20.
Relatively cheap sources of random data are USB crypto tokens. For more
information about these tokens and random number generation see the Open-
fortress website <http://openfortress.org/cryptodoc/random/>.
E Example DNSSEC key procedure
This is an example key policy is based on, so not a verbatim copy of, the key
policy as developed for RIPE NCC.
20 For instance the predictable behavior of hardware during the boot of an OS may cause bit
streams generated shortly after two boot sequences to be correlated
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Figure 17: Core size vs zone le size
 This procedure21 applies to each zone that the is signed.
 Each zone with at least one Zone Signing Key (ZSK). A ZSK is zone specic.
 The ZSK will be published in the DNSKEY Resource Record (RR) set and
signed with a Key Signing Key (KSK).
 The KSKs will have a SEP ag set so that they can be distinguished from
the ZSKs in the DNSKEY RR set.
 The ZSK may be rolled without making any announcement. The 'pre-
publish rollover scheme' as published in RFC4641 [10] is used. This will
avoid breaks in the chain of trust.
 During the rst two years of deployment, the KSK of each signed zone
will be rolled twice each year. The rollover scheme that we will follow is
the 'double signature scheme' published in RFC4661[10]. There will be an
overlap of three months to allow zone administrators to congure their new
key. o At t=0 KSK1 signs the keyset. At t=3months KSK1 and KSK2 sign
the keyset. DNS clients are expected to congure KSK2 during the three
months that follow. At t=6months only KSK2 signs the keyset until (at
21Based on the procedure published at the RIPE NCC
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t=9 months) KSK3 is introduced and a new rollover starts. o All zones
at the RIPE NCC will roll their KSK simultaneously. Signatures are valid
for one month. However, after announcing the change, the signing validity
period may be changed to the shortest operationally possible period. Also
see RFC4641[10] section 4.4.4. The ZSK will be an RSA/SHA1 key of 1200
bits (e RFC4641[10] section 3.5) The KSK will be an RSA/SHA1 key of
2048 bits.
 The KSKs to be used as 'trust-anchors' for our zones are published on a
secure website in the format used in the 'trusted-keys' statement in BIND9
named conguration les.
 The KSK will also be published in the ISC DLV registry, but only until the
root is signed.
 Any changes to this procedure and other announcements will be signed
with our PGP key and published on our secure website and a dedicated
mailing list.
F Perl's Net::DNS::SEC library
If you want to build tools to maintain your DNSSEC zones you may want to
have a look at the Net::DNS::SEC library available on (CPAN <http://search.
cpan.org/dist/Net-DNS-SEC/>). Using this extention to the Net::DNS library
it is fairly easy to write scripts such as the one below that validate that the
signature over a SOA will not expire within the next 24 hours.
#!/usr/local/bin/perl -T -Wall
#
# checkexpire.pl
# Example script that queries an authoritative server for a SOA
# record and verifies that the signatures over the record are still
# valid and will not expire in the next 24 hours.
# This anotated and somewhat verbose script is written for
# demonstration purposes only hence some possible error conditions
# are not tested for.
use strict;
use Net::DNS::SEC;
use Time::Local;
# The domain and its master server.
my $domain="secret-wg.org";
my $authoritative_server="ns.secret-wg.org";
# Setting up the resolver (use perldoc Net::DNS::Resolver for the
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# documentation of this class and its methods)
my $res = Net::DNS::Resolver->new();
# Query the default resolver to find out what the address is of the
# authoritative server.
my $answerpacket_auth_server= $res->query($authoritative_server,"A");
# Digest the packet see perldoc Net::DNS::Packet and perldoc
# Net::DNS::RR::A We ignore error checking. The first RR in the answer
# section is assumed to be the A RR for ns.secret-wg.org.
my $auth_address=($answerpacket_auth_server->answer)[0]->address;
# Set up the resolver object so it queries the authoritative server.
$res->nameserver( $auth_address );
# Set up the resolver so that it talks DNSSEC
$res->dnssec(1);
# Send the query for the soa to the authoritative nameserver.
my $packet=$res->send($domain,"SOA");
# Digest the answer section, realizing there may be more than one
# RRSIG (per definition there is always one SOA RR.
my $soa;
my @soasig;
foreach my $rr ( $packet->answer ){
if ($rr->type eq "SOA"){
$soa=$rr;
next;
}
if ($rr->type eq "RRSIG"){
push @soasig,$rr;
next;
}
}
die "NO SOA RR found" unless $soa;
die "NO RRSIGs over the SOA found" unless @soasig;
print @soasig ." signatures found\n";
# Fetch the keys that belong to this zone (DNSKEYs live, like the SOA
# at the apex.)
my @keyrr;
$packet=$res->send($domain,"DNSKEY");
foreach my $rr ( $packet->answer ){
if ($rr->type eq "DNSKEY"){
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push @keyrr,$rr;
next;
}
}
die "NO DNSKEYS found for $domain" unless @keyrr;
# Now loop over each signature, fetch the public part of the key with
# which the signature was made, validate the signature and do the date
# comparisson.
# See perldoc Net::DNS::RR::RRSIG for the methods to access the RRSIGs
# internals
SIGLOOP: foreach my $sig ( @soasig ){
print "Checking signature made with key ".$sig->keytag ."\n";
# verify the signature.
# first select the key with the proper keytag from the key set.
my $keyfound=0;
KEYLOOP: foreach my $key (@keyrr){
next KEYLOOP if ($key->keytag != $sig->keytag);
$keyfound=$key;
last KEYLOOP;
}
print "WARNING: NO public key found to validate:\n " .
$sig->string."\n" unless $keyfound;
# Do the actual validation.
if (! $sig->verify([ $soa ],$keyfound)){
# The signature did not validate. Say why.
print "WARN: Signature made with " .$sig->keytag . " failed to verify:\n".
$sig->vrfyerrstr;
}else{
# The signature validated.
# Lets verify if we have more than 24 hours before expiration.
$sig->sigexpiration =~ /(\d{4})(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})(\d{2})/;
my $expiration=timegm ($6, $5, $4, $3, $2-1, $1-1900);
my $hourstogo=($expiration-time())/3600;
print "WARNING: Signature made with ".$sig->tag. "will expire within ".
$hourstogo . " hours\n" if $hourstogo <24;
}
}
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####
# $Id: expire.pl 21 2004-10-11 14:52:09Z olaf $
####
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